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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, 1 
Claimant-Appellant, ) SUPREME COURT NO. 36024-2009 
v. 
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer, ) AGENCY'S RECORD 
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 1 
CORPORATION, Surety, 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
/FILED.-COPYI 
CLAIMANT: QUINTON BUNN 
/ 1 2m 1 1 BY: KENTA. HIGGINS 
1 1  P.O. Box 991 
S e ~ - w o f A p P e ~ S -  
mmdonATSb~-  I-. 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
DEFENDANTS: HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety 
BY: E. SCOTT HARMON 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707 
BEFORE TIHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, 
Claimant-Appellant, j SUPREME COURT NO. 36024 
v. 1 
) 
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer, ) AGENCY'S RECORD 
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 1 




BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
CLAIMANT: QUINTON BUNN 
BY: KENT A. HIGGINS 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
DEFENDANTS: HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety 
BY: E. SCOTT HARMON 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707 
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LIST OF EXHlBITS 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: TAKEN JUNE 11,2008 RE: QUINTON BUNN 
TO BE LODGED WITH THE SUPREME COURT. 
CLAIMANT'S EXHIBITS: 
1. Claimant's Exhibits QB052908-1 through QB052908-46; 
(No description provided by Claimant) 
DEFENDANTS' EXHIBITS: 
Notice of Injury dated 4130105 
LNW Denial letter dated 5/4/03 
Claimant's written response to denial letter 
Claimant's personnel file 
Deposition transcript Carol Beckstead taken 5119108 
Deposition transcript Claimant Quinton Bunn taken 12110107 
Brett A. Smith, PA, chart notes dated 512105-5120105 
Vernon S. Esplin, MD, chart notes dated 5120105-12119106 
Bear Lake Family Physician ER note 
Radiology reports dated 512105-8128106 
K. Operative reports 
L. Deposition transcript of Lisa Harvey taken 5119108 
LIST OF EXHIBITS (docket # 36024-2009 RE: QUINTON BUNN) - (i) 
- 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: LNDUSTI OMMISSION, JUDICIAL DMSION, P.O. 1720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT &kLc-- g T 2 d v  
t / C1,AIMANT.S (MIURED W O R K E R ) N M  AND ADDRESS I CLA1MAN'T.S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER I 
Quinton Bunn 
226 N. 1 1 I h  
Montpelier, ID 83254 
I Kent A. Higgins 
Merrtll & Merr~ll. Chartered 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
I TELEPHONE MnlWER: (208) 221-4409 1 (208) 232-2286 I 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injuly) 
Heritage Safe Co. 
20 Industrial Park 
Grace, ID 83241 
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. CLAIMANT'S BIR'EDATE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRaRS 
(NOT ADJUSTER'S ) NlUva AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Northwest 
6213 North Clovedale Road, Suite 150 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise, ID 83707-7507 
I STATE AND COUNTY M W3CH MrnY OCCURRED 
I Caribou County, Idaho 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNRJG AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE 
OF: $ 10.00 .PURSUANT TO TDANO CODE 8 72-419 
I I I 
!ll:Si'Rl8F HOW !YIIIRY O R  OCCIYAl ION.11 DISEASE OCCIXRED H l I A T  Il.\i'Pl:NI;I)) 
Clairnimt \\.a$ installing iocks on jnfrs \\'hitc twisting a sciuwdri\c, (:laimam felt something g i \ c  ua)" i n  lhis xrrisl. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Tom ligament in wrist ,..., ..., " 
WHAT WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? J . >  
..., . .. . 
I .  TTDITPD benefits; 
2. PPI benefits; 
3. Disability in excess of impairment; 
4. Medical bills paid; 
;-..7 
5. Payment of travel, meals and lodging:~gp@nseBfor medical treatment; 
6. Future medical bills; -. . . n u.2 ; 7 --L 
7. Attorney fees; and . . .: 
8, Retraining benefits or total permanentberiefits:l,> . , ., 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER TO WHOM NOTICF~WAS G I U ~ N  
04/03/05 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
E3 ORAL 0 WRITTEN 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED 
1. TTDITPD benefits; 
2. PPI benefits; 
3. Disability in excess of impairment; 
4. Medical bills paid; 
5. Payment of travel, meals and lodging expenses for medical treatment; 
6. Future medical bills; 
7. Attorney fees; and 
8. Retraining benefits or total permanent benefits. 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? C3 YES NO IF SO, 
PLEASE STATE WHY 
Following claimant's injury the surety arranged for Claimant to obtain treatment. He received medication and x-rays. Later, he received a letter from the 
surety stating that his injuries were non-compensable. (See attached Exhibit A). 
NOTICE: COMPLAMTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITYFUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO CODE 
IC 1001 (Rev. 110112004) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) 
Appendix 1 
Complaint - Page 1 of 3 4= 
PHYslCl4Ns WHO TREAWD CLAlMANT AND, a s )  
Dr. N.E.. Wolff Dr. Kenneth Newhouse Dr. Vernon Esplin Dr. Pat Farrell 
4536 Washington Street 560 Memorial Drive 560 Memorial Drive 500 S 11" Ave Ste 504 
Montpelier, ID 83254-1544 Pocatello, Idaho 83204-4073 Pocatello, ID 83201 Pocatello, ID 83201 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCUlRRED TO DATE? In excess of  $28.00235 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS IiAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ WliAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID. IF ANY? -$28,002.35 
I AM JNTERESTED IN MEDIATING T R I S  CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. &S o NO 
D4TE SIGNATURE OF CLAMANT OR ATTORNEY 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME ANC SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY DATE OF DEAW I 
PILING CUtdPLAmT 
WAS FlLMG PARTY DEPElOENl ON DECEASED? I oYES 0 NO DD) FlLMG PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT T W O F  ACCiDFXS? I 0, 0 NO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIXICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby cedify that on the ____ day of ZOO-, T caused to be sewed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
EMP1,OYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
(Put in lines) 
via 0 personal sewice of process 
0 regular U.S. Mail 
via: 0 personal service of process 
D regular U.S. Mail 
Stgnature - 
i<Gn"CE: An Employer or Intsuranee Comprinty sen-eci with a e'onmpltrint must Tie an Answer on F o m  P.C. 
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certif~cate of 
mailing to avoid default. If no answer isfled, a Default Award may be entered1 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
84720-0041 (208 334-6000. 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ONPAGE 3) Complaint - Page 2 of3 
JXDUSTRIAL COMMtSSION 
P.O. Box 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
Patient Name: d  
Birth Date: 
Address: ontpelier. ID 
Phone Number: J208)
SSN or Case Number
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALmORMATION 
I hereby authorize to disclose health information as specified 
Provider Name - must be spec$c for each provider 
To: 
Insurance Com,pany/Third Parry Adminislrafor/SelfInst~red Emplor~(~r/I~TIF, the+ aftornep nrp:r:ient's attornr): 
Street Address 
.- 
City State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for data: 
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: 
0 Discharge Summary 
Date@) of Hospitalization/Care: 04/03/05 to present 








I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
0 AIDS or HIV 
17 Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
0 DruglAlcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by federal Law (rt CRF Part 164) and that 
the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand 
that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization 
won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. 1 understand that the provider will not condition 
treatment, payment enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless othenvise revoked, this 
authorization will m i r e  upon resolution of  worker's compensation claim Provider, its employees, officers, copy service 
contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to 
the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes 
release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the 
specified above. 
.r c/cz,5-/' 7 
6 t e  / / 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to PatientLAutltority to Act Date 
Signature of Witness Title Date 
Original Medical Record Copy: Patient Complaint - Page 3 of 3 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIA- >MMISSION, JUDICIAL DMSION, P.O. BOW 720, BOISE, WAHO 83720-0041 / 
I 
Quinton Bunn 
226 N. I I I h  
Montpelier, ID 83254 
AMENDED WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
C O M P L r n  
1 
Kent A. Higgins 
Menill & Merrill, Chartered 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocalello. ID 83204-0991 
C i  nTMAYT S (INJwzD WORKER) NAME AND ADDRCSS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME. ADDRESS AND TELEPHOkT NWvfBER I 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury) 
Heritage Safe Co. 
20 Industrial Park 
Grace, ID 83241 
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (208) 221 -4409 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIERS 
(NOT ADJUSTER'S )NAME AND ADDRESS 
(208) 232-2286 I 
Liberty Northwest 
6213 North Clovedale Road, Suite 150 
--I 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise. ID 83707-7507 
I ________r 
I Caribou County, Idaho I OF: $ 10.00 , PI,RSUAM TO IDAHO CODE 8 72-419 I 
CLAIMANTS SOCIAL SECURITY KO CLAMANT'S BIRTKDPIZ 
b i 4 T E  AND COUNTY W WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
I I I 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OF. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHKT HAPPENED) 
Claimant was installing locks on safes. White twisting a screwdrive, Claimant felt something "give way" in his wrist. 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPA TIOSAI. DTSEASB ! 
04130105 - I 
WHiN INJWVsD. CLAIMANT WAS EARNlNG AM AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE 
--i 
I 
. -. -  . - 
SATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEh4S ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
'Tom ligament in wrist 
- ,. .- ,.. .- ..~"., -- 
WHAT WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? ! .-. :.2 . .- ,'.a 
, / I  -4 
I. TTDrrPD benefits; 
2. PPI benefits; 
3. Disability in excess of impairment; 
4. Medical bills paid; 
5. Payment of travel, meals and lodgin&$%ns@$or .- medical trearmsnt: 
6. Future medical bills; 3.2 m Z 
7. Attorney fees; and i-" I " r 
8. Retraining benefits or total permane(iI,a'Bnefi~ ... ..-~ -.. , , : .-p 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER TO WHOM NOTIC$ 56s - ~ 1 v ~ i - Y  
Ln - 
'2 . . 
04103105 My boss c? ,z 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN ORAL 0 WRITTE?~  
OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
ISSUE OR-s INVOLVED 
1. TTDITPD benefits; 
2. PPt benefits; 
3. Disability in excess of impairment; 
4. Medical bills paid; 
5. Payment of travel, meals and lodging expenses for medical treatment: 
6.  Future medical bills; 
7. Anomey fees; and 
8. Retraining benefits or total permanent benefits. 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? YES NO IF SC. 
PLEASE STATE WHY 
Followine, claimant's iniuw the suretv arranged for Claimant to obtain treatment. He received medication and x-rays. Later, he received a lener from !hu 
?OI  (Rev. 1/0112004) (COMPLETE OTHER SWE) 
Appendix 1 
Complaint - Page 1 of 2 4 
-. -. 
PiIYSlCIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND ADL.;SS) 
Dr. N E.. Wolff Dr. Kenneth Newhouse Dr. Vernon Esplin Dr. Pat Farrell 
4535 Washington Street 560 Memorial Drive 560 Memorial Drive 500 S 11" Ave Ste 504 
Montpelier, ID 83254-1544 Pocatello, Idaho 83204-4073 Pocatello, ID 83201 Pocateilo, ID 83201 
- -- 
WAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU MCURRED TO DATE? In excess of $28,00235 
WUT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? f - WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, F ANY? -$28,002.35 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. ds u NO 
DATE OR ArrORNEY 
5 - 3  I -  0 7 - 
PLEASE ANSWER THE S E T ~ F  QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
+ ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR D E A V  BENEFITS !" . .. . : , .  , -,.-.. - 7 m . .  -.- 
i NAME ANDSOCIALSECURITY NUMBER OFPARTY DAFE OF DEAM I 
RELATIOX TO DECEASSD CSAIMANT 
FlLIIjG COMPLAINT 
i '4 I 
CLAMANT MliST COMPLETE, SIGN AM) DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
WAS FLING PARTY DEPENDENTON DECEASED? 
3 YES 0 NO 
I hereby certify that on the 29TIi day of May, 2007,l causcd to be served a true and corrcct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
DID FlLMG PARTY LIVE WTH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? 
0 YES U NO 
FMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
!!oritage Safe Co. 
20 Industrial Park 
Grace. ID 83241 
Liberty Northwest 
6213 Nonh Cloverdale Road.Suite 150 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise, ID 83707-7507 
via D personal service of proccss via: D personal service of process 
B regular U.S. Mail cd regular U.S. Mail 
NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance combany served with a Complaint must f i e  an Answer on Form I.C. 
1003 with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of 
mailing to avoid default. Ifno answer kfiled, a Default Award may be entered! 
I 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
84720-0041 (208 334-6000. 
(COWLETE MEDICAL RELE4SE FORM ONPAGE 3) Compiaiot - Page 2 at: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. Box 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
Patient Name: Ouinton Bunn 
Birth Date: 
Address: 226 N. 1ltb. Mont~elier, ID 
Phone Number: (208) 221-4409 
SSN or Case Number
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTHFORMATION 
I hereby authorize - to disclose health information as specified 
,".-<;vide. f i i i~ le  - i i :~ i i .c l  bt:..?;r7~~.fii:f61. %omk l?:,'i~i<Je." 
To: - 
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/SelfInsured Employer/ISIF, their attorneys or potient 's attorney 
- - 
Street Address 
City Stale Zip Code 
Purpose or need for data: 
(e.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date@) of Hospitalization/Care: 04/03/05 to  resent 
U Discharge Summary 
0 History & Physical Exam 
U Consultation Reports 
9 Operative reports 
U Lab 
0 Pathology 
3 Radiology Reports 
D Entire Record 
0 Other: Specify 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable): 
il AIDS or HIV 
0 Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
C! biug,'/~:ioh~l Abuse in;'c,rmation 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by federal Law (rt CRF Part 164) and that 
the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I understand 
that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking the authorization 
won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider will not condition 
treatment, payment enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise revoked, this 
authorization will w i r e  w o n  resolution of  worker's cornensation claim Provider, its employees, officers, copy senrice 
contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of the above information to 
the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes 
release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding disclosure may be directed to the 
privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
Signature of Patient Date 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to PatienYiiuthority to Act Date 
Signature of Witness Title Date ' b  
Send Original To: Industrial Commssion, Judicial ~ i v i d o n ,  317 Main Street, boise, Idaho 83720-6000 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
HERITAGE SAFE CO. 
20 N. Industrial Park Rd. 
Grace, ID 83241 
I. C. NO. 2005-509704 ALLEGED INJURY DATE 04130105 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYEWSUREN (NAME 
AND ADDRESS) 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
QUINTON BUNN 
226 N. 11" 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
E. SCOTT HARMON (lSB# 3183) 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
KENT A. HIGGINS 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
/ Boise. ID 83707-6358 
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIERS (NOT 
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP. 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 7507 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND (NAME AND ADDRESS) 
I I , '-- I 
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
The lndustrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the lSlF by stating: m - - 
I I 7 - 7  - 
2. That the employerlemployee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the ldaho Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
- I. ,r'l 
,o > - 
D 2 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged i phe  C@plaint actually 
occurred on or about the time claimed. 






7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer 
within five months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the 
disease was contracted. 
Denied 
X 
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage 
pursuant to ldaho Code, Section 72-419: $UNKNOWN 
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the ldaho 





10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? NONE I 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly - entirely - by 
an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was 
due to the nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually 
exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or 
employment. 
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, 
was given to the employer as soon as practical but net later than 60 days after such 
accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such occupational disease. 
(Continued from front) 
1 1 .  State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any 
affirmative defenses. 
A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein. 
1 B. Whether Claimant's action is time barred pursuant to I.C. §72-706. 
C. Whether Claimant's condition is causally related to the alleged April 30, 2005 incident or is a result of a pre- 
existing or subsequent condition. 
D. Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent partial impairment andlor disability in excess of impairment and 
appropriate apportionment. 
/ E Whether Claimant is entitled to TTDiTPD benefits. 
1 F. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical benefits pursuant to I. C. $72-432. 
1 G Whether Claimant is totally disabled. 
1 H. Whether Claimant is entitled to retraining benefits. 
I. Whether Claimant is entitled to any other benefits. 
J. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I .  C. s72-804. 
K. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovely in this matter has only just begun. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of sewice of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy 
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be sewed on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by 
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause 
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. 
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 111(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under 
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I. C. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THlS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. -YES -NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THlS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY: 
Kent A. Higgins 
Attornev at Law 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date 
P.O. B ~ X  991 
Pocatello. ID 83204 
PLEASE COMPLETE b4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the l/- day of JUNE, 2007,l caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
Dated 
q443-7 
via: service of process 
- X regular U.S. Mail 









E. Scott Harmon 
ISB 3183 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
621 3 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Telephone (208)327-7563 
FAX 800-972-321 3 
Employees of the Libeay Mutual Group 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




Heritage Safe Company, 
Employer, 
and 





g . ., m 
COME NOW, Defendants, Heritage Safe Co., and Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp., 
Surety, by and through their attorney of record, E. Scott Harmon, and pursuant to Rule 
Vlll(C)(2) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedures of the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Idaho, submit this Request for Calendaring. Defendants state: 
1. That the Defendants will be ready for hearing on or after May 1, 2008. 
2. That the desired location of the hearing is Pocatello, ID. 
1 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
3. The estimated length of the hearing is one-half day. 
4. The issue(s) to be heard are: 
A. Whether Claimant's action is barred pursuant to the Statute of Limitations 
372-706. 
5. Defendants unavailable dates for hearing after May I ,  2008, are: 
May 1-2; 6-9; 23; 26-29 
June 2-6; 13; 23-27 
July 3; 7; 21 
6. It is unknown whether settlement can be reached in this matter. 
7. Defendants do not feel this matter requires a hearing before the full 
Commission. 
8. Defendants are not aware of any other information needed by the 





2 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
dZ 
DATED this / /- day of February, 2008. 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
/Nf E. Scott Harmon 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
b# I hereby certify that on the //-- day of February, 2008, 1 caused a copy of the 
foregoing document to be served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
at the address identified below: 
Kent A. Higgins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
3 - REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
E. Scott Harmon 
E. Scott Harmon 
ISB 3183 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Telephone (208)327-7563 
FAX 800-972-321 3 
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 












) DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
) TO BIFURCATE ISSUES 
) 
1 
and ) .- := 
1 




Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp., -11 i-2 ;U I?? - 
1 1, " 
w 
I-% - 
Surety, ) 22 IU 
) xG D 
Defendants. 1 ~n Q 
) ;" W 
J 
COME NOW the Defendants, Heritage Safe Co. and Liberty Northwest Ins. 
Corp., by and through their attorney of record E. Scott Harmon, pursuant to Rule III(E) 
of the Judicial Rules and Practice of Procedure and move for an Order bifurcating the 
issues in this case for hearing. 
1 - DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES 
This motion is made for the reason that the initial issue to be determined in the 
above-entitled case is the issue related to the Statute of Limitations. This issue should 
be determined prior to Claimant moving forward with any other issues. 
This Motion is made and based on the pleadings and documents on file with the 
Commission herein. 
OR 
DATED this // day of February, 2008. 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER 
& DAY 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r-R I hereby certify that on the - day of February, 2008, 1 caused a copy of 
the foregoing document to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Kent A. Higgins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 8,3204 
 E. Scott Harmon 
2 - DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO BIFURCATE ISSUES 













) ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES 
) AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
1 
F % t E D  
Pursuant to Defendants' Motion to Bihcate Issues and Request for Calendaring 
both filed February 12, 2008, The Referee having reviewed the file herein and being fully 
advised in the premises, 
HEREBY ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Bihcate  is GRANTED. 
FURTHER, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above- 
',".; .#-.-. ;,; .*.-.:: ,.-i....-. ;.i, "as,,#.-  , .,,,, i..,,. ?,.> >:,..5,.<r "8*: ....., -: 2,.8,,?; ~T">.,; ,...~,p~~....~~~,,.7. ->Tv...,,?,,.. ..,. .,,,>,. : ,, ,:> entitled matter on ;1:um!Ejj:&l.>,>Q@08 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~ j ~ ; M : : ~ > . F Q ~ ~ ~ ~ ] E ~ ~ : & @ ' ~ & ~ ,  in the hdustrial 
, .....,,,..,... . ,.$ ..,.,.; ,.., $,,;';.,i..,: .,... .. ..:..,..,,,..,,... ,,.:..".A ...... i,.: e....,-... .. .,<*; ... .,. i; ........-,,. 
Commission Pocatello Office, at 1070 Hiline, Suite 300, City of Pocatello, County of Bannock, 
State of Idaho, on the following bifurcated issue: 
1. Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations 
requirements set forth in Idaho Code 3 72-701 through Idaho Code 
5 72-706, and whether these limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho 
Code 5 72-604. 
-6. 
DATED this (lday of March, 2008. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-ttt 
I hereby certify that on the =day of March, 2008, a true and correct copy of 
the ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES AND NOTICE OF HEARING was served by U&i,i;$-@:'$;r;iT@s:c;,&~$f@;@ii"m upon o  the follow ng: 
. , , .  .. 
Kent A. Higgins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
E. Scott Harrnon 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise. ID 83707 
and by regular United States mail to: 
Sandra Beebe (Home: 208-785-5056 or Cell #: 680-3241) 
P.O. Box 658 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
send an e-mail. 
ORDER TO BIFURCATE ISSUES AND NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Claimant, 
v. 





) IC 2005-509704 
1 
) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
) AND RECOMMENDATION 
) 
) 
) F I L E D  
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 8 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned this 
matter to Referee Douglas A. Donohue. He conducted a hearing in Pocatello on June 11, 2008. 
Kent A. Higgins represented Claimant. E. Scott Harmon represented Defendants. The parties 
presented oral and documentary evidence and submitted briefs. The case came under advisement 
on September 30,2008. It is now ready for decision. 
ISSUES 
The sole issue to be resolved according to the notice of hearing is: 
Whether Claimant has complied with the notice and limitations requirements set 
forth in Idaho Code § 72-701 through Idaho Code § 72-706, and whether these 
limitations are tolled pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-604. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends his Complaint should be deemed timely filed within the statutes of 
limitation. Employer misled Claimant into believing his claim would be paid. By operation of 
RECOMMENDATION - 1 
Idaho Code § 72-604 or other equitable means, the limitation of Idaho Code 5 72-706 was tolled. 
Defendants contend Claimant was not misled because Surety sent an appropriate denial 
letter. Claimant's Complaint was filed more than one year after the claim. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in the instant case consists of the following: 
1. Hearing testimony of Claimant and a supervisor, Carol Beckstead; 
2. Claimant's Exhibits 1 - 46; and 
3. Defendants' Exhibits A - L. 
After considering the record, the Referee submits the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendation for review by the Commission. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Claimant was hired by Employer on March 14, 2005. On April 25, 2005, 
Claimant began working as a lock installer. This job required frequent twisting of his wrist as he 
inserted screws to fasten the locks onto safes. 
2. Bor laimant was 25 years old when this claim began. 
3. On May 2, 2005, Claimant notified Employer of a wrist problem. Employer's 
records variously report the pain began April 28, 30, or May 2, 2005. He complained of 
right wrist pain arising from the repetitive motion. He speculated that he suffered carpal 
tunnel syndrome. 
4. Claimant first sought treatment on May 2,2005. Physician's assistant Brett Smith 
diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome and restricted Claimant from using a manual screwdriver. 
An X-ray showed a normal right wrist. 
RECOMMENDATION - 2 
5. On May 4, 2005, Surety sent correspondence denying the claim. Surety did not 
pay and has not paid any compensation to Claimant. 
6. On May 10, 2005, an MRI showed mild fiaying of the triangular fibrocartilage 
complex without a tear. The radiologist suggested consideration of a vascular cause based 
upon Claimant's report of "tingling" and the absence of clinically significant findings on MRI. 
7. On May 20, 2005, Claimant was examined by K.E. Newhouse, M.D. Claimant's 
history included numbness, tingling, coldness, and swelling, in addition to the pain alone 
which he had previously reported to physicians. Dr. Newhouse tentatively diagnosed possible 
vasospasm secondary to overuse vs. possible reflex sympathetic dystrophy. 
8. A May 23, 2005 EMG and nerve conduction velocity study showed 
no abnormalities. 
9. On May 27, 2005, a magnetic resonance angiography failed to indicate a 
vascular component to Claimant's complaints. 
10. On May 30, 2005, Claimant sent a letter to Surety. He denied that his injury 
was a carpal tunnel syndrome and affirmed that his physicians related the injury - whatever 
it may be called in diagnosis - to his work. He requested the Surety again review its decision. 
11. Claimant continued to seek treatment and eventually underwent surgery. 
12. Claimant filed a Complaint in this matter on May 31, 2007, more than two years 
after any potential date for the accident or manifestation of an occupational disease. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER ENDINGS OF FACT 
13. Statutes of Limitation. Idaho Code (j 72-706(1) provides a one-year limit on 
the filing of a Complaint where no compensation has been paid. Where some compensation has 
been paid and thereafter discontinued, Idaho Code (j 72-706(2) provides a five-year limit. 
RECOMMENDATION - 3 
14. Here, Claimant alleges alternatively that Employer somehow provided 
compensation by authorizing medical treatment or, failing that, the authorization misled him in 
such a manner as to invoke the tolling statute, Idaho Code 5 72-604. Analyzing the latter 
argument first, Idaho Code 72-604 applies where an employer "willfully fails or refuses to file" 
a notice of injury or change of status report. Neither condition has occurred; A Form 1 was filed 
and a denial letter was sent. Idaho Code 9 72-604 does not toll the statute in this matter. 
15. Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served to mislead Claimant about 
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The belief or expectations about payment held 
by Claimant's treaters do not establish that Claimant was misled. Neither Claimant's nor any 
physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. 
Below are three reasons why. 
16. First, Claimant received a denial letter. His subsequent request for a review 
does not legally require further response from Defendants. Claimant does not allege that any 
oral promises were made which may have misled Claimant after he received the denial letter. 
17. Second, nothing about Employer's alleged actions in assisting Claimant to see 
the first physician have created a liability for Defendants. An employer has the right to choose 
a treating physician whenever the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law may apply. See, 
Idaho Code 5 72-435. The designation of an initial physician does not create any liability on 
Defendants' part. Questions of causation can only be answered by a physician. The speculations 
of an employee or an employer do not establish a causal link between physical complaints 
and eligibility under Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. A claimant must provide medical 
testimony that supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. 
Langlev v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). 
RECOMMENDATION - 4 
18. Third, Employer's actions which occurred before Surety's denial letter do not 
negate the clear expression of the denial of liability expressed therein. In their respective roles, 
a surety would be expected to have more familiarity with the law than would an employer. 
A surety, in large part, is primarily engaged in administering claims and benefits according to 
the law. A business, in large part, is primarily engaged in making and selling a product or 
service. Thus, by their expected roles, by the clear express wording of the denial letter, and by 
the fact that the "last word" on the matter came through the denial letter, no reasonable person 
could have been misled by Employer's alleged statements or actions which occurred upon 
and immediately after receiving notice of a claimed injury or occupational disease. 
19. The Referee finds Claimant was not actually misled into thinking he need not 
file a timely Complaint. 
20. Claimant's alternative argument - that treatment somehow constitutes 
"compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation statute is based upon payment. Idaho code 
5 72-706. By relevant statutory definition, "compensation" equates with "payment of 
medical benefits." Idaho code § 72-102(7); Bainbridae v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 
111 Idaho 79, 721 P2d. 179 (1986). Even Claimant's cited case, Park v. Mountain Valley 
Timber, 200 WL 2799942 (2000), supports the proposition. In &&, compensation was 
"paid" because Employer acquiesced to Claimant's self-help method of reimbursement for 
medical bills. In w, the receipt of treatment did not trigger the five-year statute; the payment 
for medical bills incurred did. 
21. Eventually, Claimant's argument would lead to the conclusion that every time 
an employer designated a physician to check out a potential workers'-compensation-related 
injury or occupational disease, its surety would be automatically liable for benefits regardless 
RECOMMENDATION - 5 
ofwhether the potential injury or disease met the other statutory requirements as determined 
by the Idaho Legislature. 
22. Claimant failed to show any basis for the application of the five-year statute, 
Idaho Code 5 72-706(2). Thus, the one-year statute, Idaho Code 5 72-706(1) applies. 
23. Claimant failed to file his Complaint within the time prescribed by Idaho Code 
5 72-706(1). Claimant failed to show a basis upon which Idaho Code 5 72-604 or any other 
statute or equitable doctrine should be applied to toll the limitation statute or to excuse by 
some other theory his untimely filing of the Complaint in this matter. Claimant's claim should 
be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Claimant's Complaint for income benefits was not timely filed. His Complaint should 
be dismissed. 
RECOMMENDATION 
The Referee recommends that the Commission adopt the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law as its o n and issue an appropriate final order 
,--8 '. J 
DATED this /, day of October, 2008. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMJSSION , 
Dsglas  A. Doaohue, Referee 
RECOMMENDATION - 6 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-717, Referee Douglas A. Donohue submitted the record 
in the above-entitled matter, together with his recommended findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to the members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review. Each of the 
undersigned Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee. 
The Commission concurs with these recommendations. Therefore, the Commission approves, 
confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Claimant's Workers' Compensation Complaint for income benefits was not timely 
filed. His Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. 
ORDER - 1 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
DATED this 16 ( day of 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I .. hereby ... .,,.,,, ~ ,.,,... ,.: .,,,: certify ", ,,: ,.,<.: ,.,?. that ".,: on ~ the ,.,.. ,,,.; /o' day of oL$3be~ ,2008 a true and correct , .. , . . . ,., _ 
copy of . . .  . . , . H N D I N ~ S f ~ ~ ~ : O N ~ E U ~ ~ , @ ~ S ; ' ~ ; 2 Q ~ E R  , . . .Y,L ; ..,.,.,.: .,.,... .~..,.,...,. . . ,  Y:;., .>;. - ... ,.. ..,..., ~ . ,  . were sewed by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
Kent A. Higgins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
E. Scott Harmon 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707 
ORDER - 2 
I OCT. 30. 2 0 0 8  5 : 0 4 P M  MERRILL & M E R R i l L  
I, 
Kent A, Higgins 
MElRRILL & haERRILL, CHARTERED 
I09 North Arthur - 5th Floor 1. P.O. Box 991 
Poqtello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF'IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, 1 
-I 
I 
Claimant, ) X,C. No. 2005-509704 
1 
vs. 1 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 










Claimant, Quinton Bunn, brings this Motion pursuant to Idaho Code 8 72-718 and the 
Judicial Rdes ofpractice and Prbcedureundw the Idaho fVorkerYs Compensation Law, Rule 3P. 
This Motion is made for the &rounds and reasons set forth in the accompanying Brief. 
Motion for Reeonsideration 
0:\69\6943WhadingsWtion for Reconsiddoaupd Page l 
Kent A. Higgins 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, 
) 
Claimant, ) I.C. No. 2005-509704 
VS . 1 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 











Claimant, Quinton Bunn, brings this Motion pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-718 and the 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, Rule 3F 
This Motion is made for the grounds and reasons set forth in the accompanying Brief. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Motion for Reconsideration.wpd Page l 
6 DATED this day of October, 2008. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the do hereby certifL that 
2 true, full  and correct copy of the foregoing 2008, served 
upon the following in the inanner indicated below: 
E. Scott Ha~mon 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
P.O. Box 6358 [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 ] Telefax 
nCT. 30. 2008  5 : 0 4 P M  M E R R I L L  & M E R R I L L  
Kent A. Higgins 
ME-L & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthut - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box991 , 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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.-- Gig- 
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Claimant, ) I.C. No. 2005-509704 
) 
j 
BIUEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
















1. me Surotv "misIead" Ouiaton within the meanine of Idaho Code 6 72-706, 
Withoutlimitingthe swpe of QuintonBunn7s disagreematwiththereferee's determination, 
' 
for purposes of this Brief, Quinton BU& focuses on thxee paragraphs of the determination. First 
are paragraphs 15 and 16 which read as follows: 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsicleration 
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Brief in Support of  Motion to Reoonsider.wpd Page l 
Kent A. Higgins 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
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Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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1. The Suretv "mislead" Ouinton, within the meaning of Idaho Code 8 72-706. 
Without limiting the scope of Quinton Bunn's disagreement with the referee's deterhination, 
for purposes of this Brief, Quinton B u i  focuses on three paragraphs of the determination. First 
are paragraphs 15 and 16 which read as follows: 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943WleadingsBrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd Page 1 
4 
15. Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served to mislead 
Claimant about eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The 
believe or expectations about payment held by Claimant's treaters 
do not establish that claimant was misled. Neither claimant's nor 
any physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the 
Idaho workers' Compensation law. Below are three reasons why. 
16. First, Claimant received a denial letter. His subsequent request for 
a review does not legally require further response from Defendants. 
Claimant does not allege that any oral promises were made which 
may have misled claimant after he received the denial letter. 
Referee Donohue, at the both the hearing and in the briefing, was asked to consider whether 
"mislead" for the purposes of Idaho Code 5 72-706 includes innocent misleading, as well as 
intentional. In other words, where the surety or the employer unintentionally mislead the claimant, 
by telling him he has no coverage, should the surety or the claimant bear the consequences. This 
issue was never addressed in the Opinion. Exhibit 12, the letter from Liberty Nothnvest telling 
Quinton that his claim did not meet the requirements of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Law, is 
misleading on its face. It implies Quinton's condition is a non-acute occupational disease. The 
surety, no doubt, was mislead by the diagnosis of the physician's assistant. Granted, the Liberty 
Northwest's letter to Quinton stating he had no coverage may have been innocent in its intent. But 
nonetheless, it was misleading. Unlike the opinion of Referee Donohue, other states hold that the 
employer and the surety stand i n a  fiduciary relationship to the claimant. The consequences of a 
mistaken denial fall on the surety and the employer, not on the claimant. For example, in Deere v. 
Sarasota Countv School Bd., 880 S9.2d 825 (2005), the Court of Appeals for Florida explained: 
Where an EIC [Employer / Canier] misleads a claimant about his or her rights or 
availability of workers' compensation, even unintentionally, resulting in the 
claimant's failure to file a timely claim, the E/C will be estopped from denying 
benefits. Raymond v. Rapid Express Parcel Delivery of Tampa, 548 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 
1'' DCA 1989). Because the JCC failed to consider whether Appellant demonstrated 
estoppel, we REVERSE the denial of the petition for benefits and REMAND for the 
JCC to make such a determination. 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943U'leadingslBrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd Page 2 
Having advised Quinton that he had no coverage, Liberty Northwest had a duty to Quinton to correct 
their denial letter when notified that his diagnosis was changed. In some states the misinformation 
constitutes an estoppel against the surety's defense of Statute of Limitations. In Idaho, the 
consequences of misleading is a statutory. 
2. Heritage safe "~aid"co~nwensation for vurposes of Idaho Code 72-706(2) 
In paragraph 20, Referee Donohue says: 
20. Claimant's alternative argument - that treatment somehow 
constitutes "compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation statute 
is based upon payment. Idaho code 5 72-706. By relevant statutory 
definition, "compensation" equates the "payment of medical 
benefits." Idaho code 5 72-102(7); Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade 
Plvwood Mill, 11 1 Idaho 79,721 P2d. 179 (1986). Even Claimant's 
cited case, Park v. Mountain Timber, 200 WL 2799942 (2000), 
supports the proposition. In &&. compensation was "paid" because 
Employer acquiesced to Claimant's self-help method of 
reimbursement for medical hills. In &&, the receipt of treatment did 
not trigger the five-year statute; the payment for medical bills 
incurred did. 
According to the opinion, the exception in Idaho Code § 72-706(2) turns entirely upon the 
word "payment". Such a rendering is a very strict interpretation, not a liberal interpretation in favor 
of claimants, as required by the Worker's Compensation Law. By the referee's interpretation && 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943Wleadings\Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd 
v. Mountain Timber , 200 WL279942 (2000), turns purely on the fact that the claimant stole 
sufficient property from the employer to make a "self help" payment by the employer for the medical 
benefits. Such is not, nor ought not to be, the Idaho law. By interpretation the phrase "when 
payments of compensation have been made" would not include medical benefits. But the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined in Bainbridae v. Boise Cascade Plwood Mill Co., 11 1 Idaho 79,721 
P2d. 179 (1986), that the phrase "payments of compensation" when liberally construed, includes 
payment of medical benefits. By the same policy, "payment" of medical benefits would also include 
furnishing of medical benefits, providing of medical benefits, or authorization of medical benefits, 
as it does in other states. 
.In McNeillvv. Farm Stores. Inc., 553 So.2d 1279 (1989), the courtreachedthe opposite conclusion 
of that of the Referee in Quinton's case. The court explained: 
Here, Dr. Cather was McNeilly's authorized physician at the time of the injury, and 
remained so at the time of his September 1987 visit, which was within two years of 
the employer's last payment of benefits. The fact that McNeilly paid for the visit 
personally is also irrelevant, in that the significant event is the rendition ofremedial 
treatment before the expiration of the two year period, and not the payment of the bill 
therefore. Seamco at 900. Therefore, the JCC erred in holding that the September 
1987 visit was not furnished by the employerlcarrier so as to revive the limitations 
period on that date, and the April 10, 1988 claim for benefits was timely filed. 
This is not the case, as Referee Donahue implies, where the employer sends the claimant to 
the doctor to examine. This case has "treatment" written all over it. 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943WleadingsBrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd Page 4 
CONCLUSION 
Other paragraphs of the opinion could be specifically addressed, but since the whole opinion 
follows the logic of expressed in the three cited above, these illustrate the error in the approach of 
the opinion. 
For these reasons Claimant requests that the opinion be reconsidered. The fact Exhibit 12 
is, on its face, misleading in denying claimant benefits because of an occupational disease, and the 
fact that the treatment receiBd by Claimant was authorized should lead to the opposite result. 
DATED this s p a y  of ~ctober ,  2008. 
MERRILL & MSjPRILL, CHARTERED 
By: 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
0:\69\6943\PleadingsWrief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.wpd Page 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the above-referenc atter, do hereby certify that dy of October, 2008, sewed a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this - 
upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
E. Scott Harmon U.S. Mail 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY [ ' S Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 6358 [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 Telefax 
E. Scott Harmon 
ISB 3183 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
6213 N. Cloverdale Rd., Ste. 150 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Telephone (208)327-7563 
FAX 800-972-321 3 
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group 
Attorney for Defendants 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 








COME NOW Defendants, Heritage Safe Company and ~ i ~ e r t ~  Wrthwest 
. ." , ,~ 
Insurance Corporation, by and through their attorney of record, E. Scott Harmon, and, 
pursuant to J.R.P. Rule 3(F) hereby object and respond to Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
1 - DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 2, 2008, I.C. Referee Donohue issued his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation in this case determining that Claimant's 
filing of a Complaint in the instant matter was governed by the one-year statute of 
limitations set forth in I.C. §72-706(1) rather than the five-year statute of limitations set 
forth in I.C. §72-706(2); that Claimant was not misled into thinking that he did not need 
to file a timely Complaint; and, that the Claimant's May 31, 2007, Complaint regarding 
the asserted late April or early May, 2005, onset of pain in Claimant's right wrist did not 
meet the statute of limitations. The Commission unanimously adopted Referee 
Donohue's recommendation as their own on October 10, 2008. 
On October 30, 2008, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and supporting 
Brief. This writing constitutes Defendants' response thereto. 
N. 
ARGUMENT 
In a nutshell, Claimant, relying upon two Florida cases', renews his arguments 
previously submitted to and ruled upon by this Commission that either Claimant's 
misunderstanding of his condition absolves him of any responsibility to timely pursue his 
claim or that, in the alternative, under the facts presented, the Commission ought 
somehow construe a "payment of compensation" made in order that the five-year statute 
1 Both Deere v. Sarasota County School Board, 880 So.2d 825 (2005) and McNeilly v. Farm Stores, 553 
So.2d 1279 (1989) explore a Florida judiciary's treatment of Florida's statutory language arising under a 
Florida scheme of statutes of limitation very different from the formulation provided us by the Idaho 
Legislature. Of even greater interest, even Florida has limited the scope of its McNeilly decision. See, 
Continental Can Co. v. Bailey, 668 So.2d 695 (1996). 
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of limitations set forth in I.C. §72-706(2) may be applied. In sum, Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration seeks nothing more than a Commission re-weigh of evidence already 
thoroughly weighed and decided upon. 
A. Claimant's Misunderstandina Does Not Excuse His Failure to Timely File a 
Complaint. 
The thrust of Claimant's argument, as it was during initial hearing and briefing in 
this case, is that Claimant's failure ought be excused because Surety's denial denied 
coverage for the condition Claimant and his health care provider initially said he suffered 
from, not the condition he was ultimately found to suffer from. In Myers v. Quest, 144 
ldaho 280, 160 P.3d 437 (2007), citing Bainbridge v. Boise Cascade Plywood Mill, 110 
ldaho 79, 82,721 P.2d 179, 182 (1986), the Court again recognized that: 
Statutes of limitation are clearly creatures of legislative enactment and not 
within the domain of the judiciary to impose. 
Though recognizing that the Legislature had provided various instances under which the 
statutes of limitation may be tolled, the Court recognized that: 
The Legislature has not provided that the statute of limitations.. .is tolled by 
the employer's failure to inform its employees of its requirements of that 
section. 
Myers, 160 P.3d at 438. 
Nor are Defendants required to issue iterative denials as Claimant and his health 
care providers change their diagnoses. In Ewing v. Holton, 135 ldaho 792, 25 P.3d 103 
(2001), Claimant initially filed a claim for an asserted carpel tunnel syndrome arising out of 
her repetitive work as a dental hygienist. Through further care, the condition was later 
potentially diagnosed as fibromyalgia. Following an IME provided by the Employer and 
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Surety, State Fund denied the claim on the basis that no physician could, on a more 
probably than not basis, tie her condition to her employment. Nine months after the SIF 
denial and some 15 months after Claimant's first asserted date of injury, upon yet another 
physician's diagnosis, Claimant filed a new claim along with a Complaint now asserting 
her condition to be RSD. Rejecting Claimant's argument that the Commission ought not to 
have held against her to the fact that she was unaware of the condition she actually 
suffered until after the one-year statute of limitations on her first claim expired, the Court 
affirmed the Commission's dismissal of Claimant's Complaint for failure to have filed within 
the one-hear statute of limitations. Id. at 109 - 110, 25 P.3d at 796 - 797. 
Claimant has not demonstrated that any action or alleged statement by either 
Employer or Surety come under these facts, misled him into his prejudice. 
B. There Was No "Payment of Compensation" Upon Which to Premise Application of 
the Five-Year Status of Limitations. 
Claimant's reliance on the Florida McNeilly case is misplaced. There, the Florida 
court interpreted an unusual provision in Florida statute under which a previously granted 
authorization to follow up with a treating physician need not be renewed unless more than 
two years had elapsed between treatments. Id. at 1280. The Florida court determined 
that, under that statutory scheme, Claimant's entitlement was driven by the date upon 
which the care was rendered, not the date upon which payment for the care was made. 
Id. at 1281. McNeilly has no persuasive impact on the instant matter. 
Claimant continues to urge that the phrase "payments of compensation" in 
§72-706(2) or, presumably, the phrase "no compensation ...p aid thereon" as used in 
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§72-706(1), really doesn't require "payment", despite the clear use of the term. Rather, 
Claimant castigates the Referee and Commission by asserting that the Commission's 
interpretation of Park v. Mountain Timber, I.C. 97-000347, 2000 WL 279942 (Feb. 17, 
2000) "turns purely on the fact that the Claimant stole sufficient property from the employer 
to make a 'self help' payment by the employer for the medical benefit." Claimant's Brief is 
Support, pp. 3-4. Claimant, however, ignored the Referee's language clearly 
demonstrating that it was not Park's thievery which formed the basis for the determination 
of "payment" in that case but, rather, employer Mountain Timbers' acquiescence in 
Claimant's self help methodology which demonstrates the "payment." 
111. 
CONCLUSION 
Apparently conceding that there is no support in either Idaho Statute, Rule, or 
Case Law to support his unusual argument, Claimant has turned to a Florida court's 
interpretation of Florida's statute to support his request that the Commission re-weigh 
evidence previously submitted and ruled upon. Statutes of limitation are, though, as 
recognized in Bainbridge and Myers, both supra, uniquely creatures of legislative 
creation. There is no provision in Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law which mirrors 
the Florida statutory scheme interpreted by the Florida court. Claimant has failed to 
demonstrate any error in the Referee's Decision of October 2, 2008, which the 
Commission has fully adopted as its own. 
5 - DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
PR Respectfully submitted this /A- day of November, 2008. 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON & WHITTIER 
B .  d L  E. Scott Harmon 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
b-4 I hereby certify that on thismay of November, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon the 
following: 
Kent A. Higgins 
Merrill & Merrill, Chtd. 
P. 0. Box 991 
Pocateilo, ID 83204-0991 
/d/ 
E. Scott Harmon 
6 - DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Kent A. Higgins 
MERRlLL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, 
Claimant, ) I.C. No. 2005-509704 
) 
VS . ) 
) REPLY BRIEF 










The question to be decided on reconsideration is: Can the Surety or Employer avoid the five 
year allowance to file a claim, provided for in Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) by simply not paying for 
Claimant's Reply Brief 
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treatment the Surety or Employer has authorized. In the Order of October 10, 2008, Referee 
Donohue says: "Claimant's alternateargument - that treatment somehow constitutes 'compensation' 
is unpersuasive." Recommendation, ¶ 20. Mostjurisdictions would disagree with that conclusion 
by the referee. In contrast, overwhelmingly, the majority of jurisdictions are persuaded that 
treatment is compensation. Thus, when the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, when posed 
with the very same question in Frank v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 96 Colo. 364,43 
P.2d 158 (1935), framed the question as follows: 
To obviate this purported defense, and avoid the apparent bar, the claimant relies 
upon the sentence immediately following the passage just above quoted, namely: 
'This limitation shall not apply to any claimant to whom compensation has been paid. 
He conten'ds that the furnishing of the services rendered by, or under the direction of, 
the company's physician constituted- in view of the power and authority granted the 
physicianby the company's contract described below - the payment of compensation 
within the meaning of the language used. 
96 Colo. at 369-70. 
In answer to the question the Court said: 
Whether the company would have been charged with such responsibility if it had 
not had actual notice or knowledge need not be now determined or considered. 
Here such notice or knowledge was proved. And by the express terms of the 
contract, the treatment was to be given just as was done. This, so far as the 
claimant is concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) the exact 
equivalent afpayment; 
96 Colo. at 372. (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, inOklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213,23 P.2d 381 (1933), 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzed: 
In the case at bar, claimant was not paid compensation, but was furnished medical 
treatment for more than a month. The case therefore presents a question of first 
in~pression in this state, viz., whether or not the furnishing of medical treatment alone 
is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations (section 7301, supra). 
We are of the opinion that the furnishing of medical treatment recognizes liability 
arid constitutes the equivalent of thepayment of compensation, and is sufficient to 
toll the statute. 
23 P.2d at 382. (Emphasis added). 
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In the State of New York, the Supreme Court analyzed: 
Even though the usual medical care which is regarded as an advancepayment of 
compensation is one in which the employer directly retains the physician, or the 
physician or nurse is in the general employment of the employer, it seems clear that 
within the intent of the statute, a direction to a claimant to get medical care, which 
he literally follows, and as a result of whichmedical care is actually given, can also 
constitute hrnishing of medical treatment. 
Colangelo v. B.S. McCarey Company, 13 A.D.2d 592.(1961). (Emphasis added). 
In Cantone v. Health Enterprises Management, Inc., 308 A.D.2d 646,764 N.Y.S.2d 
294 (2003), the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of New York explained: 
However, "remuneration in the form of wages or medical treatment may constitute 
advance payments o f  compensation, rendering inapplicable the limitations period 
established by workers' Compensation Law 28, where the remuneration is provided 
in recognition of liability." 
397 A.D. 2d at 647. (Emphasis added). 
In Arkansas, the Court of Appeals, in Plante v. Tyson Foods, lnc., 46 Ark. App. 22,876 
S.W.2d 723 (1 984) expressed the following: 
The supreme court has held that the furnishing of medical services constitutes 
payment of compensation in the context of this statute, and that such "payment" 
suspends the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. 
26 Ark. App. at 24. (Emphasis added.) 
In accord is the Missouri Court of Appeals, which, in McDaniel v. General Motors 
Assembly Division, 637 S.W.2d 194 (1982) reasoned as follows: 
As pertinent here, the claim must be filed within one year after the injury or within 
one year after payment has been made by reason of the injury. Medicaltreatment of 
a disability has been interpreted as being a payment, and a claim filed within one 
year thereafter is timely. Welborn v. Southern Equipment Co., 395 s.W.2d 119,124 
(Mo hanc 1965); Lloyd v. County Electric Co., 599 S.W.2d 57,60 (Mo.App. 1980). 
The question then, is whether the supplying of salve and directing its application by 
the employer's nurse constituted medical treatment, for the claim was filed within 
one year thereafter. Certainly, if an employer's doctor's advice that an employee take 
warm water soaks for an ankle injury constitutes medical treatment, as in Faries v. 
ACF Industries, 53 1 S.W. 2d 93,99 (Mo.App. 1975), or, similarly, a company nurse 
supplying an ace bandage for a sore knee tolls the statute as in Morgan v. Krey 
Claimant's Reply Brief 
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packing Co., 403 S.W.2d 668,670 (Mo.App. 1966), a fortiori the salve prescribed for 
a bad back likewise tolls the statute. The claim was thereby timely. 
637 S.W.2d, at 195-196. (Emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of ~ennessee applied the same logical approach in Universal 
Underwriters Insurance Co., v. A.J. King Lumber Company, 553 S.W. 2d 749(1977). Therein 
the court reasoned: 
The.furnishing of medical services by a physician employed by the employer or 
insurer is such a "voluntary payment of compensation." Reed v. Genesco, Inc., 
Tenn., 512 S.W.2d 1 (1974); Fields v. Lowe furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 415 
S.W. 2d 340 (1967). The fact that no "payments" were made from November 16, 
1972, the date of the first payment, until January 21,1973, when they were resumed 
did not constitute a "ceasing: within the meaning of the statutory proviso. 
553 S.W.2d, at 750. (Emphasis added). 
Likewise in Spencer v. Stone Container Corporation, 72 Ark.App. 450,38 S.W.3d 909 
(2001), the Court of Appeals of Arkansas Third Division explained: 
Our oft-stated rule is that for purposes of the aforementioned statute of limitations, 
"tlze,furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of compensation . . ." 
Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 197,424 S.W.2d 365,366 (1968). Moreover, 
an employer is deemed to be furnishing such services if it has either actual notice of 
has reason to know of a claimant receiving medical treatment.. 
72 Ark. App. at 456. (Emphasis added). 
In McGhee v. Oklahoma Metal Heat Treating, 644 P.2d 127 (1982), the 
Court of Appeals of Oklahoma Division No. 1 faced the interpretation of a statute 
which reaa: 
The right to claim compensation under this act shall be forever barred unless within 
one (1) year after the injury or death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be 
filed with the commission. Provided, however, claims may be filed at any time 
within one (1) from the date of last payment of any compensation or remuneration 
paid in lieu of compensation. 
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In the end, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma concluded: 
All in all, we conclude on the undisputed facts of this case that the claim was timely 
filed. It was undisputed that the claimant's employer took him to the hospital and 
paid his bills following the accident. It was undisputed that the insurance carrier later 
told the claimant to go to a doctor. 
Although Referee Donahue found "claimant's argument - "that treatment somehow 
constitutes 'compensation'- is unpersuasive," that argument seems to have found a good deal of 
traction in virtually every other jurisdiction that has considered it. In fact, it would seem even the 
Supreme Court of Idaho would find some persuasion in that argument in light of its following 
statement in Ryen v. City of Coeur D7AIene, 11 5 Idaho 791,770 P.2d 800 (1989). There the court 
said: 
Claimant argues that the definition of compensation supplied by I.C. 4 72-102(5) 
purports to include "all of the income benefits and the medical and related benefits 
and medical services," and is controlling. We agree. We further view the question 
to have been clearly answered in Bainbvidge v. Boise-Cascade Plywood Mill, 11 1 
Idaho 79,721 P.2d 179 (1986) and Facer v. E.R. SteedEquipment Go., 95 Idaho 608, 
514 P.2d 841 (1973). In Bainbvidge we held that I.c. 4 72-706(2) "compensation" 
includes both income and medical benefits for the purposes of the tollingprovisions. 
There, compensation was viewed to be "a word of art under the Workman's 
Compensation act and it refers to income and medical benefits ..." 
1 15 Idaho, at 793. 
Referee Donohue aptly notes that "by relevant statutory definition 'compensation' equates 
with 'payment of medical benefits'." He addresses the decision of Park v. Mountain Timber, 2000 
Westlaw 279942 (2000), where the employer never paid for medical care, except through the self- 
help method of the claimant for reimbursement of his medical bills. Yet, in Park, the Commission 
found that the requirement for payment of medical benefits had been met. Referee Donahue 
distinguishes Park, noting that the compensation was "paid" through the injured employee's self- 
help method of reimbursing himself through surreptitious removal of his employer's property. 
The points where Quinton takes issue with Referee Donohue's opinion are twofold: first, we 
disagree with his conclusion that treatment for an occupational injury is not a medical benefit of the 
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Workmen's Compensation Code; and secondly, we disagree with his conclusion that it is the actual 
monetary payment to the medical provider - not the affording of care to the injured employee - that 
triggers the five year statute of limitations provided for in Idaho Code 5 72-706. 
Once again, other jurisdictions have looked at these very issues. Other jurisdictions are 
virtually unanimous in reaching the opposite conclusion; i.e. they universally agree that the 
furnishing of the care to the employee, - it is not the payment to the doctor - that constitutes 
"payment" for the sake of the worker's compensation statute. This is clearly the more logical 
conclusion for a myriad of reasons. First, as in Idaho Code $ 72-706(2), the expression "When 
payments of compensation have been made. . ." refers to payments to the injured employee. The 
statute concerns itself with compensation to Idaho's laborers - not their physicians. Since medical 
benefits are not "paid" to a claimant, the affording to, authorization of, furnishing to, providing for 
medical benefits to an injured employee is the same as "payment" for the sake of Worker's 
Compensation Statutes: 
In Heflin v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 244 Ark. 195 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968), the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas addressed a similar statute that also turned on the word "payment" The court then 
reasoned: 
The opinion in the case points out that the holding of the Ragon case followed the 
general rule that the furnishing of medical services constitutes payment of 
compensation within themeaning of s 81 -13 18(b) andthat such ["payment" suspends 
the running of the time for filing a claim for compensation. The decision is not in 
any respect based on the time at which the medical bills were paid. This holding is 
sound because the claimant is "compensated"by the furnishing of the services and 
not by the payment of the charges therefor. 
244 Ark. at 197. (Emphasis added). 
In contrast to the analysis of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Referee Donohue's 
recommendation or findings in this case concludes: "In Park, compensation was "paid" because 
employer acquiesced to claimant's self-help method of reimbursement for medical bills. In Park, 
the receipt of treatment did not trigger the five year statute; the payment for medical bills incurred 
did." Recommendation 20. That opinion reaches the opposite conclusion and reasoning of the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas in Heflin. 
Claimant's Reply ~ r i k f  
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Other courts that have considered the same issue side with the reasoning of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court. For example, the District Court of Appeals in Florida decided in Gilbert v. 
Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, 674 So.2d 818 (1996), that a worker's compensation 
claimant's receipt of medical care from an authorized provider for injuries causally related to his 
industrial accident tolled the running of the statute of limitations, despite the claimant's failure to 
request the enlployer or surety to pay the hospital servicesunder worker's compensation. 
In Infante v. Mansfield Construction Company, 47 Conn.App. 530, 706 A.2d 984 
(1998), the Appellate Court of Connecticut explained: 
The exception is, no doubt, based upon the fact that if the employer fumishesmedical 
treatment he must know that an injury has been suffered which at least may be the 
basis of such a claim [for compensation]. Gesmundo v. Bush, 133 Conn. 607,612, 
53 A.2d 392 (1947). In the event that a representative or agent of the employer, 
authorized to send the employee to aphysician, does so, that constitutes furnishing 
medical treatment forpurposes of the exception. Id. It is clear that the defendants 
were not ignorant of the injury, and do not claim to be prejudiced in any way. Evert 
i f  the employer did rtot pay for the medical treatment furnished by a physician 
selected by him, he has "furnished" such treatment within the meaning of the 
statute if he has sent the claimant for medical treatment, thereby authorizing it. 
47 Conn.App. at 535-36. (Emphasis added). 
In Arvinmeritor, Inc. v. Redd, 192 P.3d 1261 (2008) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
explained: 
The issuepresented in the present matter is whether a claimant may, within two 
years aper the last authorized medical treatment, when the examination and 
treatment are allowed by stipulation of the employer, amend the claim to include 
additional injury from the same cumulative trauma. We answer in the affirmative. 
In reasoning its opinion, the court concluded: 
[Wle find that Arvinmeritor, by stipulating to the treatment by Dr. Ruffin, including 
a complete examination as well as allowing for treatment and physical therapy, 
Redd's continuing medical treatment was authorized. Since this continuing medical 
treatment was authorized, the state of limitations was tolled. 
192 P.3d at 1263. (Emphasis added). 
Claimant's Reply Brief 
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma relied upon its decision a year previous in 2007 in 
American Airlines v. Hickman 164 P.3d 146 (2007). The court framed the argument in 
Hickman, as follows: 
The employer argues that Ibarra v. Hitch Farms, 2002 OK 41, 48 P.3d 802, in 
construing 5 43(A), holds that the operative event in determining whether the statute 
of limitations has been tolled is not the authorization of medical treatment, but the 
last payment of authorized medical treatment. Because the employer did not pay for 
the claimant's examination when he was sent to the MedCenter by his supervisor, the 
employer claims that the statute of limitations was not tolled. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then grappled with the same issue that must be grappled with 
in this case, namely what happens when neither the employer nor the surety actually "pay" for the 
medical treatment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then proceeded with its reasoning as follows: 
In Ibarra the facts reveal that the claimant, Ibarra, had received medical treatment, 
and the employer had paid for the authorized treatment. Ibarra, 2002 OK 41, f/ 2,48 
P.3d 802. In the case now before this Court, no payment was made. The question 
we must answer is whether the ambiguous statute construed in Ibarra excludes 
tolling the statute of limitations where medical treatment was authorized, but not 
payment was made for the treatment. The claimant answers that the employer 
should not be able to avoid the tolling of the statute of limitations by simply not 
paying for treatment if authorized We do not believe that Ibarra precludes the 
date of treatment as the operative date for tolling the statute of limitations found 
in 5 43(a) of title 85. 
164 P.3d at 149. (Emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee faced the same issue in Fields v. Lowe Furniture 
Corporation, 220 Tenn. 212,415 S.W.2d 340 (1967). Treatment had been furnished, but the bills 
had not been paid. The Supreme Court of Tennessee addressed the issue as follows: 
[Tlhe question thus presented is whether or not treatment of this employee by the 
company doctor in May, 1964, tolled the statute, hereinafter to be quoted. There is 
no showing that these bills for the treatment of this man up until May, 1964, or that 
the bili of the doctor to whom the company doctor has referred the man to in 
Nashville, had ever been paid. As a matter of fact the record is rather to the effect 
that these hills had not been paid by anyone. 
415 S.W. 2d at 341. 
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The Tennessee Supreme Court answered the question as follows: 
There is no doubt that, under the facts appearing in the record, the services rendered 
for the compensable injury here established by the evidence operated to avoid the bar 
of the statute. The company's contract recognized its liability to render, or to pay the 
expense of such services, and conferred upon its physician generally authority for 
furnishing those services and supplies in all cases. Hence, inasmuch as all the 
evidence shows that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury of which the 
company forlhwith received actual notice and knowledge, the treatment given him 
fell within the class which, under both the statute and the contract, imposed upon the 
company unqualified financial responsibility. This, so far as the claimant is 
concerned, was (at least under the facts shown herein) the exact equivalent of 
payment; and he was thereby exempted from the requirement of serving the 
commission with written notice, because "compensation has been paid" 
220 Tenn. at 217-218. (Emphasis added). 
Likewise, in Seamco Laboratories v. Pearson,424 So.2d 898 (1983), the District Court 
of Appeals for Florida reasoned: 
The deputy commissioner in the case sub judice correctly noted that even though Dr. 
Molloy did not submit a bill or a report to the employerlcarrier within the two-year 
period, as the Vincent physician did, he rendered remedial treatment before the 
expiration of the two-year period. It is tire re media^ treatment that toCls the statute, 
not the report of the treatment. 
424 So.2d at 899-900. ( ~ m ~ h a s i s  added). 
Also, the Court of Appeals for Kansas, in Sparks v. Wichita White Truck Trailer Center, 
Inc. 7 Kan. App. 2d 383,642 P.2d 574 (1982) reasoned: 
As we read the cases, in determining whether medical care is "compensation" under 
the act neither the fact nor time ofpayment of the bills is determinative; the issue 
is whether the medical care was authorized, either expressly or by reasonable 
implication. If the claimant receives medical care with the reasonable expectation of 
payment by the employer the care is "compensation" when rendered even though it 
may never be paid for. 
* * * 
Once the employer assumed the. responsibility of furnishing medical care the 
workman was entitled to rely on that action; notice of termination to the doctor was 
not notice to the claimant. In that case it appears the doctor had never been paid for 
his services, but the furnishing of those services under what appeared to the 
claimant to be the authority of the employer amounted to 'payment of 
compensation" to the claimant. 
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7 Kan. App. at 385-386. (Emphasis added). 
All of this brings us back to our original question: Whether an employer or the surety can 
preclude the triggering of the five year statute of limitations of I.C. 5 72-706(2) by refusing to pay 
for medical care or treatment it has authorized. The answer, if rendered in virtually any other 
jurisdiction, is clearly: "no," they cannot. The determining factor should be whether or not a 
claimant is afforded medical treatment by the employer or surety, not whether the employer or surety 
made or withheld payment for the treatment. 
2. Was Quinton Bunn Mislead by Libertv Northwest. 
The other issue of the decision that Quinton Bunn takes issue with is with is the following 
language in the opinion: 
Claimant contends his Complaint should be deemed timely filed within the 
statutes of limitation. Employer misled Claimant into believing his claim would be 
paid. By operation of Idaho Code 572-604 or other equitable means, the limitation 
of Idaho Code 5 72-706 was tolled. 
Defendants contend Claimant was not misled because surety sent an 
appropriate denial letter. Claimant's Complaint was filed more than one year after 
the claim. 
Recommendation, p.1-2 
By way of clarification, Quintons' contention is not that he was mislead into believing his 
claim would be paid. His contention was that he was mislead when told by Liberty Northwest that 
Idaho Worker's Compensation laws would do nothing for him. Idaho Code $ 706(1), the one year 
statute of limitations, clearly provides an exception: "unless mislead to his [claimant's] prejudice 
by the employer or surety." No doubt, the letter from Liberty Northwest was erroneous. It told 
Quinton he could not be covered. The question to be addressed is not whether Liberty Northwest 
mislead Quinton tobelieve he would be covered, but whether the consequences for a surety's error, 
albeit unintentional, in informing an injured employee that worker's compensation can do nothing 
for him, or her, should be suffered by the injured employee or the surety. 
In Raymond v. Rapid Express, 548 So.2d 278 (1989). The First District Court of Appeal 
for Florida answered the question as follows: 
Where the EIC, [employerlcarrier] intentionally or otherwise, 
Claimant's Reply Brief 
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misleads the claimant as to his rights or the availability of workers' 
compensation benefits with the result that the claimant fails to timely 
file his claim, the E/C will be estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations as a defense. Bovd v. Florida Memorial Colle~e. 475 
So.2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 19851; Foster Wheeler Enerav Group v. 
Fairhurst, 405 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Catalano v. 
Hillsborol~gh Countv Board o f  Public Instruction. 249 So.2d 24 
(Fla.1971); Jenkiw v. M.H. Harrison Construction Companv. 228 
So.2d 91 1 (Fla.1969); Enple v. Deerborne School. 226 So.2d 681 
(FIa.1969); tiowanik v. Biscavne Electric, Inc.. 139 So.2d 678 
(Fla.1962); Baptist Village v. Newton,--3551 (1978), cert. 
denied, 368 So.2d 1362 (Fla.1979). 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming also concluded, in Bauer v. State of Wyoming,95 P.2d 
1.048 (1 985) that a surety's innocent -but nonetheless misleading- statements to aninjured claimant 
that the claimant did not have worker's compensation coverage,' was sufficient to allow an estoppel 
to the State from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. The Wyoming High Court engaged 
in an lengthy analysis and a survey of the law on the same issues from other jurisdictions. Rather 
than repeat that lengthy review in this brief, a copy of the opinion is included as an exhibit to this 
brief. 
SUMMARY 
In its final analysis, this case is about a young man who suffered a serious disabling injury 
to his dominant hand while doing his duty of tightening screws with a screwdriver for Heritage 
Safe Company. 
Heritage Safe, through Carol Beckstead, made an appointment with its preferred medical 
provider, Lakeview Medical Clinic. Carol Beckstead testified, "1 tell - - at the time I tell the doctor's 
office, your know, that it will be billed to Liberty Northwest at that time." All the intake documents 
at the hospital indicated that Quinton Bunn was seen as a worker's comp case with the responsible 
party being Heritage Safe. The First report of Injury or Illness prepared by Heritage, Exhibit 1 
confirms Quinton was sent for" h-eatment." The Incident 1 Accident Investigation form, Exhibit 3 
also confirms that "medical attention [was] needed.. No doubt, Heritage Safe "provided' Quinton 
' Because of the part-time nature of her work. 
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with medical treatment. No doubt, Liberty Northwest mislead Quinton when it gave as its reason to 
deny him coverage that: employers are not liable for " nonaccute occupational disease." 
Referee Donohue, in conclusion of his recommendation opines that: "Eventually claimant's 
argument would lead to the conclusion that every time an employer designated a physician to check 
out a potential worker's compensation related injury or occupational disease, its surety would 
automatically be liable for benefits regardless ofwhether the' potential injury or diseasemet the other 
statutory requirements as determined by the Idaho Legislature." Recommendation 21. But this 
is not that case. This case is not about the situation where the employer or the surety sends the 
employee for an examination for the sole purpose of finding whether the employee is entitled to 
compensation. This is not the case where the employer or surety seeks an examination to see 
whether an injured employee is capable of returning to work. Neither Quinton, nor Liberty 
Northwest, nor Heritage Safe made the argument that the Quinton was sent to Lakeview Medical 
Clinic solely to determine whether he had suffered a compensable injury. He was sent for and did 
receive treatment, including injections, a splint, icing instructions and pain medication. Idaho Code 
5 72-432 provides for medical treatment for occupational injuries is a benefit under the worker's 
compensation law. 
When Idaho Code 5 72-706(2) refers to "when payments of compensation have been made, 
i t  is talking about payments to the claimant, because, by judicial interpretation it includes medical 
benefits. It is talking about the providing or furnishing or affording of medical benefits to the 
claimant. It does not mean that if the employer or the surety arrange for the claimant to receive 
medical benefits, but thereafter stiff the medical provider on its bill, the surety can thereby annul the 
triggering of the five year statute of limitations under 'ldaho Code 5 72-706(2). That statute is 
triggered when the injured employee is furnished the treatment. 
Finally, Liberty Northwest and other sureties are in the business of workers compensation 
claims on a daily basis throughout every state in these great United States. They have professionals, 
with years of experience, who write those denial letters. They have a battery of lawyers and 
researchers to guide their decisions to send denial letters like Exhibit 12. On the other hand, injured 
employees such as Quinton Bunn, young, inexperienced, working frequently for at or near minimum 
wage, will usually encounter no more than one occupational injury in a lifetime. 
Claimant's Reply Brief 
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When the legislature provided that a surety who misleads a claimant cannot benefit from the 
one year statute of limitations, the legislature did not say that the surety's actions must he criminal, 
willful, or even negligent. Clearly, the letter written by Liberty Northwest to Quinton Bunn was 
plainly wrong. Liberty Northwest stood in a superior position to correct the consequences of the 
error once the error was discovered. Because Liberty Northwest ignored Quinton's helpless and 
unknowledgeable effort to correct the error, either Quinton or the Surety must hear the consequences: 
either Liberty Northwest should take responsibility and help Quinton, in the manner that Idaho 
Workers Compensation laws were intended to help injured employees, or Quinton must go though 
life with his dominant hand disabled, paying his own medical hills, even though he injured his duties 
hand performing his duties to his employer. 
The question comes down to whether it is true Quinton should hear the loss, instead of 
~iber ty  Northwest, because Quinton believed Liberty Northwest was in a superior position to inform 
him accurately as to whether he had a right to compensation. If such is the law, such ought not to 
he the law. 
For these reasons, Quinton Bunn would ask the commission to reconsider its October 2"d, 2008 
Opinion and acknowledge the legitimacy of his claim. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of November, 2008. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the above-referencedmatter, do hereby certify that 
atrue, full and correct copy of the foregoingdocument was this 20th day ofNovember, 2008, served 
upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
E. Scott Harmon [H U S .  Mail 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY [ ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 6358 [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
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363 Stipulations -
Supreme Court of Wyoming. Constmction and Operation in General 
Sherry L. BAUER, Appellant (Employee-Claimant), 363k14(10> k. Agreed Statement of Facts. Most 
v. 
STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant). 
No. 84-77. 
March i. 1985 
Claimantwho was employedpart time by to,wnasmember 
of ambulance senrice sought worker's compensation 
benefits for ruptured ear drum and resulting surgery. The 
District Court, Carbon County, Robert A. Hill, J., 
determined that claim was barred by statute oflimitations, 
and claimant appealed. The Supreme Court, Cardine, J., 
held that employer's unintentional-but-misleading 
statements to claimant that claimant did not have worker's 
compensation coverage because of part-time nature of her 
work were sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent 
employer and State from invokingstatuteof limitations as 
a defense, since claimant had valid, meritorious claim that 
was not filed because of reliance upon employer's 
representation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Cited Cases 
In worker's compensation proceeding, it would be 
inappropriate to find that employee's supervisor was 
probably acting as nurse for attending physician at time 
she suggested that employee wasprobably not covered by 
worker's compensation because of minimal part-time 
nature of employe's occupation as member of town's 
ambulanceservice, in light of town's stipulation that town 
gave such advice to its employee as result of honest 
mistake. 
121 Clerks of Courts 79 -65 
79 Clerks of Courts 
79k64 Powers and Proceedings in General -
k. Nature and Extent of Authority. 
Cited Cases 
Although statute provides that clerk or his designee shall 
review reports of injury to ascertain whether worker's 
compensation case should be docketed, it was not within 
province of clerk of court to determine whether case was 
barred by statute of limitations, since procedural 
protections provided by statute include right to judicial 
decision on matter. W.S. 1977, $ 27-12-601(a), 
27-12-602(a). 
Thomas, C.J. and Rooney, J., filed separate dissenting pJ Workers' compensation 413 -1283 
opinions. 
West Headnotes 
LlJ Stipulations 36.3 -14(10) 
4 13 Workers' Compensation -
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
41 3XVKF) Claims for Compensation 
413XVI(F)4 Excusing Want Of, or Defect or 
Delay in Making Claim 
413k1283 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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Statute of limitations for worker's compensation clain~s, 
which contains no provision for tolling because of 
excusable neglect or to relieve hardship in particular 
circumstances, was absolute bar to claim unless doctrine 
of equitable estoppel prevented raising of statute of 
limitations defense. W.S. 1977, 5 27-12-503. 
pJ Estoppel 156 -52(3) 
156 Estoppel -
156111 Equitable Estoppel -
1561IlfA~Nature and Essentials in General 
Nature and Application of Estoppel in 
Pais 
156k52(3) k. Estoppel by Conduct. Most 
Cited Cases 
Estoppel flows from actual consequences produced by 
conduct of A on B regardless of whether A intended those 
consequences; it is immaterial whether conduct falsely 
misrepresented situation or fraudulently concealed truth. 
Workers' Compensation 413 -1300 
41 3 Workers' Compensation -
Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
41 3XVI(F) Claims for Compensation 
4 13XVI(F)4 Excusing Want Of, or Defect or 
Delay in Making Claim 
413kl300 k. Discretion of Court or Board to 
Excuse Delay or Waive Strict Compliance. Most Cited 
Cases 
If workers' compensation claimant has valid claim which 
is lost because of some action by employer or insurance 
provider reasonably relied upon by claimant to her 
detriment, relief should be granted. 
Q Workers' Compensation 
Injuries for Which Compensation May Be 
Had 
413V11L(E) Defenses Against Claims for 
Compensation; Misconduct of Employee 
k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Althwgh Worker's Compensation Division of State is 
granted rights as broad as those of employer, applicable 
statute does not confer greater rights or permit state to 
asseri defenses not available to employer. W.S. 1977, 5 
27-12-608. 
Workers' Compensation 413 -1114 
4 13 Workers' Compensation -
Waiver and Estoppel as to Right to Claim or 
to Deny Liability for Compensation 
413k1 1 I4 k. Estoppel Of, or Waiver By, 
Employer, or Insurance Carrier. Most Cited Cases 
Employer's unintentional-hut-misleading statements to 
claimaht that claimant did not have workers'compensation 
coverage because of part-time nature of her work were 
sufficient to constitute estoppel and prevent employer and 
State from invoking statute of limitations as a defense, 
since claimant had valid, meritorious claim that was not 
filed because of reliance upon employer's representation. 
W.S. 1977, $ 27-12-503. 
"1049 Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant. 
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Fen., and 
Terry J: Hams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), forappellee. 
Before THOMAS,E C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,E 
BROWN and CARDINE, JJ. 
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FN** Chief Justice at time of oral argument. 
CARDME, Justice. 
JIJ The parties in this case stipulated to the following 
facts: The town of Saratoga had taken over supervision of 
the ambulanceservice from Carbon Countyapproximately 
thirty days prior to this injury. The appellant was 
employed part time by the town of Saratoga as a member 
of the ambulance service. Shesuffered amptured eardrum 
in the course of her employment on December 14, 1981, 
and sought medical treatment the next day. She was 
advised by her supervisor that she was not covered by 
worker's compensation because she was a part-time 
employee.= 
FN The dissenting opinion of Justice Rooney 
is misleading when it states: 
"It is difficult to treat Ann White's advice, 
given in the doctor's office while treating 
appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being 
given on behalf of the Town of Saratoga * * 
* $, 
No one testified in this case. Nowhere in the 
record is it stated that Ann White's advice was 
given in the doctor's office while treating 
appellant. The case was presented to the trial 
court upon stipulated facts, agreed to by the 
parties. With respect to this matter, the 
stipulation states: 
"When the subject injury occurred, and 
thereafter, Employee had considerable 
conversation and consultation with the same 
Ann White, who did not believe that Worker's 
Compensation coverage existed because of the 
minimal part-time nature of the occupation." 
Further, appellee conceded that Ann White 
was acting on behalf of the town of Saratoga 
when it agreed in its brief that: 
"In the case at bar, the employer, Town of 
Saratoga, did no more than give bad advice 
which was the result of an honest mistake as to 
the existenceinon-existence of coverage.'' 
Tlie appellee havingstipulated that the town of 
Saratoga gave bad advice as a result of an 
honest mistake, it is inappropriate to suggest 
the contrary by stating that Ann White "was 
probably acting as a nurse for an attending 
physician at the time" (emphasis added) in a 
private capacity when she advised appellant 
concerning coverage under worker's 
compensation. 
121 Appellant underwent surgery on March 24, 1982. In 
March 1983, when it became apparent that additional 
surgery would be necessary, appellant requested that the 
hospital apply for payment under worker's compensation. 
The second surgery for the injury that occurred during her 
employment was performed on April 6, 1983. At that time 
she again discussed worker's compensation with the chief 
executive officer of her employer, the mayor of Saratoga, 
who agreed that she should he covered. Appellant then, 
during April 1983, attempted to file a worker's 
compensation*1050 claim. The clerk of court rejected the 
claim because it was not timely fi1ed.m Appellant was 
allowed to file her claim on July 19, 1983. The court, 
thereafter, determined that the claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
FN2. Section 27-12-601(a), W.S. 1977, states in 
part: 
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"[Tlhe clerk or his designee shall review the 
reports of the injury to ascertain whether the 
case should be docketed." 
However, 5 27-12-602(a), W.S.1977,requires 
that " * * * the judge shall set the case for 
hearing at the earliest possible date and direct 
notice of the hearing to be issued by the clerk 
of the court * * *." In situations where there is 
a dispute as to the right of the employee to 
compensation or the amount to be awarded, a 
right to a hearing is provided. The procedural 
protections include the right to a judicial 
decision on the matter. It is not within the 
province of the clerk of court to determine 
whether cases are barred by the statute of 
limitations. See, R.L. ManninpCo. v. MillsapL 
Wvo.. 687 P.2d 252 (19841 and Herrine v. 
Welltech.'lnc.. Wvo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983r 
We reverse. 
The only issue presented by appellant is: 'Whether 
Appellant has a legally, excusable reason for failure to 
comply wit11 $ 27-12-503, W.S.1977." This statute 
provides in part: 
"(a) No order or award for compensation involving an 
injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence 
rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, 
shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the 
injury, an application or claim for award is filed with the 
clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred, 
within one (1) year after the day on which the injury 
occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one 
(I)  year after discovery of the injury by theemployee. The 
reports of an accident do not constitute a claim for 
compensation." 
We stated in In re Martini, 38 Wvo. 172. 265 P. 707 
(1928). that the legislature had fixed the applicable time in 
which a claim could be filed and, therefore, an exception 
could not be read into the law because the result would be 
legislation rather than statutory construction. We, 
however, expressly did not resolve the question here 
presented, stating: 
"Whether the limitation, notwithstanding the fact that it is 
said to be jurisdictional, may be waived under certain 
circumstances, as is held by some of the courts, need not 
be decided, for the question does not arise here. It is clear 
that without such waiver, the limitation is, under the 
authorities already cited, mandatory." (Emphasis added.) 
In re Martini, suvra, 265 P. at 708-709. 
The question we treat here does not involve statutory 
construction. The statute is clear and unambiguous. It 
contains no provision for tolling because of excusable 
neglect or to relieve hardship in particular circumstances. 
Thus, the statute here has nm and is a bar to this claim 
unless the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents raising 
the statute-of-limitations defense. 
It is established policy that worker's compensation statutes 
and the law applicable thereto should be liberally 
construed to the end that just claims of workers will be 
paid whenever possible. Jurisdictions such as ours, with 
statutes not providing tolling for excusable neglect, apply 
waiver 01' equitable estoppel to prevent the employer from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense where the 
lateness was the result of the employer's assurances, 
misrepresentations, negligence, or fraudulent deceptions. 
3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation $ 78.45. 
There are no jurisdictions which always hold their 
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statutes of limitation to be a total bar in worker's 
compensation cases. All jurisdictions allow late filings 
under some circumstances. These circumstances range 
from good faith misrepresentations by employers to a 
requirement of deliberate and actual fraud. Fraud, either 
actual or legal, will toll the statute of limitations, &r&g 
1,. Aerna Casualhi & Sureh~ Ca., 147 Ga.App. 662. 249 
S.E.2d 661 (19781, as will a reasonable reliance on 
incorrect information and active misleading conduct. 
Cohen 1,. indus/rial Comm'n ofArizona, 133 Ariz. 24,648 
P.2d 139 (1982). "1051 Thus, where the failure Lo file 
the claim resulted from the direct intervention of the 
employer's agents and all parties believed that the accident 
was not covered by worker's compensation, equitable 
estoppel prevented the defense of statute of limitations. 
Levo v, Generai-Slzea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570.280 P.2d 
1086 (1955). Estoppel flows from theactualconsequences 
produced by the conduct of A on B regardless of whether 
A intended those consequences or not. 
MaplewoodPackinxCo.. Me.. 375 A.2d 534 (1977). It is 
immaterial whether the conduct falsely misrepresented the 
situationor fraudulently concealed the ttuth. The employer 
is estopped to plead the statute of limitations. Cambron v. 
Co-operative Dislributinp Co., Kv., 405 S.W.2d 687 
(1966); Pacific Emoloverslns. Co. v. Industrial Accident 
Conzm'n, 66 Cal.App.2d 376, 152 P.2d 501 (19441. Where 
the employer's carrier gave information with no intent to 
deceive or mislead but his conduct did just that, estoppel 
applied because the employer, having assisted the 
employee, could not complain about action taken or not 
taken. Roherl.son v. Bri.~sev!~ Garape, Inc., 270 S.C. 58, 
240 S.E.2d 810 (1978). The employer is estopped when 
the claimant is deceived; the deception occurs when the 
employee i s  lulled into a false sense of security. 
Tarljmetti v. Workmen's Compensation Au~eal  Board 63 
Pa.Cmwlth. 456. 439 A.2d 844 (1981); Ashcraft v. 
Hunfer, 268 Ark. 946. 597 S.W.2d 124 (Aup.1980) .~  
But fraud should not be the *I052 only basis for relief in 
worker's compensation cases. The limitation period is 
short-just one year. The injury resulting to the worker 
during the course of her employment is our concern. If she 
bas a valid claim which is lost because of some action by 
the employer or the insurance provider (here the state of 
Wyoming) reasonably relied upon by the employee to her 
detriment, relief should be granted. 
FN3. Chief Justice Thomas in his dissenting -
opinion relies upon Turner v. Turner, Wvo.. 582 
P.2d 600 (1978L for his conclusion that this 
court for all time committed itself to the 
proposition that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel will arise only where action of the 
employer lulls the employee "into a false sense 
of security or causes him to believe he will be 
taken care of without filing a claim." 
Fraudulently misrepresenting to the employee 
that he is not covered by worker's compensation, 
knowing that to be false, for the purposc of 
causing him not to file a claim would not "lull" 
him into a false sense of security. And so it 
would seem that an employee can be "lulled" 
into a false sense of security only where the 
employer promises something, such as the 
payment of a sum of money in settlement or 
payment of his medical bills thus making it 
unnecessary for him to file a worker's 
compensation claim. The Chief Justice, here, is 
taking about the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. 28 Am.Jur2d Estoppel and Waiver 6 
tf8. See also, Anno., Promises to Settle or 
Perfonn as Estopping Reliance on Statute of 
Limitations. 44 A.L.R3d 482. 488 (19721 
wherein it is stated that: 
"Oneof thebroadest generalizations employed 
by the courts as a starting point is a statement 
to the effect that one cannot justly or equitably 
lull his adversary into a false sense of security 
* * *," 
This is the starting point, not the end. In 
Turner v. Turner, supra, parties to the lawsuit 
were making offers and counter offers of 
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settlement, dealing at arms length, when the 
statute of limitations expired. There was no 
firm settlement or promise to pay, and plaintiff 
was not lulled into believing the litigation was 
settled when the statute expired. Turner v. 
Turner, supra, dealt with offersipromises, not 
misrepresentations of fact. 
In the instant case, no promises were made to 
the worker, no offers of settlement nor promise 
to pay her med~cal bills were made, and she 
could not be lulled into a false sense of 
securlty under these circumstances. She was 
simply given false information by her 
employer concerning her right to have her 
surgery covered by worker's compensation. To 
say that equitable estoppel will apply if her 
employer makes a false promise, but will not 
apply iT he makes a false statement, is 
irrational. That is not the holding of Turner v. 
Turner, supra, which also stated: 
" '[A]ctual Craud in the technical sense, bad 
faith or intent to mislead are not essential to 
the creation of an estoppel, but it is sufficient 
that the defendant made misrepresentaiiona u1 
so conducted himself that he misled a pasty, 
who acted thereon in good faith, to the extent 
that such party failed to commence the action 
within the statutory period * * *.' " At p. 602 
(quoting from In re Piener's Estate, 224 
Cal.App.2d 670, 37 Cal.Rptr. 46 (19641). 
If we hold as the dissenting opinion suggests 
now, it would be only amatter of timeuntil we 
would have before us a case in which an 
employer falsely and fraudulently 
misrepresented to an employee his rightsunder 
worker's compensation for theexpress purpose 
of inducing him not to file a claim within the 
period of limitation provided by the statute. 
Better that we lay that matter to rest now. The 
rule proposed by the dissent is not the majority 
mle, nor are the cases listed for that 
proposition the "better reasoned opinions." 
Finally, it is stated that the cases cited in the 
opinion of the court "do not all stand for the 
propositions for which they are cited * * *." 
The cases referred to were not cited for their 
holdings, but are merely illustrative of the 
approach of various courts of the application 
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to raising 
the bar of the statute of limitations in worker's 
compensation cases. 
In McKaskle v. Industrial Comm'n ofArizona, 135 Ariz. 
168,659 P.2d 1313 (19821 theinjured employeewas told 
by the employer that he was not covered by worker's 
compensation because he was an independent contractor 
and not an employee. Later he learned that he was 
covered. The court stated: 
"The claimant may be equally harmed by his reasonable 
i-&fifii.a 6~ ci:hc; 'i;c;si$.,c' -: 'ze~&:e' cssertisns. Nor 
are we persuaded that a characterization of coverage or 
compensability as a 'question of law' renders the principle 
of estoppel inapplicable." Id. 659 P.2d at 13 17- 13 18. 
In Leva v. General-Shea-Morrison. suora, thecourt stated: 
"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a flexible one, 
founded in equity and good conscience; its object is to 
prevent a party from taking an unconscionable advantage 
of his own wrong while asserting his strict legal rights. 
Seemingly the only strict legal right that we are asked to 
adhere to is the statute which was passed solely for the 
benefit of the employer and the insurance carrier, i.e., the 
Statute of limitations. 
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applied to the town of Saratoga, 
"It is contended that there is involved a question of law as 
opposed to a question of fact and that the claimant is as 
responsible for knowing the law regarding the situation as 
were the insurance company, the employer, the industrial 
accident board and those others involved. However, even 
if we were to ascribe to the contention that i t  is solely a 
question of law, it would be a v e v  narrow construction of 
the statutes regarding Workmen's Compensation if this 
court were to say that a claimant should find it his duty to 
examine all the technicalities concerning the Workmen's 
Compensation Act and come to a right conclusion while 
the employer and the insurance carrier, whose 
responsibilities are far greater, should be excused because 
of their misinterpretation of the Act itself, which 
misinterpretation the etnployer in turn foisted offupon the 
claimant." 280 P.2d at 1090. 
The State here contends that estoppel is not warranted 
because the bad advice was merely an honest mistake and 
cites Larson for the proposition, 
"[ilf the employer's had advice was the result of an honest 
mistake due to the uncertain state of the law at the time, 
estoppel is not warranted." 3 Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation C) 78.45. 
The basis for thatstatement is acaliforniacase which held 
that the city's advice was reasonable when given "due to 
the uncertain state of the law" at that time. CiN ofLos - 
Anaeles v Jnduslrial Accident Commission. 63 Cal.2d 
255.46 Cal.RDtr. 105,404 P.2d 809 (1965). In the instant 
case, the state of the law is not uncertain. The worker here 
was covered by worker's compensation. That is not 
disputed, And had she, contrary to the advice of her 
employer, filed a claim, it would have been paid. 
" * * * it would not be appropriate as to the Appellee State 
of Wyoming, as the Appellee State of Wyoming not only 
administers and defends the Town of Saratoga's industrial 
accident account, but also all the monies in the worker's 
compensation fund." 
Section 27-12-608, W.S.1977, provides: 
"The director or his designee may for any reason appear 
in the district court and defend against any claim andshall 
in all respects have the same rights of defense as the 
employer. Failure to contest*1053 a claim does not 
constitute waiver by the director of his right to reopen an 
award where he does not appear and defend at the original 
trial." (Emphasis added.) 
The purpose of this statute is to establish the rights of the 
State "as broad as the right of the employer and employee, 
so as to give the state full measure of protection." 
Wvomina~tate Treasurer, er rel. Workerk ~ o m ~ e n s a t i o n  
Div. v. Svoboda. Wvo., 573 P.2d41 7x420 (19781, quoting 
Mamh v. Aljoe. 41 Wvo. 220. 227. 284 P. 260 (1930). 
Althoueh the worker's com~ensation division of the state - 
of Wyoming is granted rights as broad as those of the 
employer, there is nothing in the statute which confers 
greater rights or would permit the State to assert defenses 
not available to the employer. 
f7J Appellant had a valid, meritorious claim that was not 
filed because of reliance upon her employer's 
representation that she was not covered by worker's 
compensation. We hold that the employer's misleading 
statements. althoueh unintentional. were sufficient to - 
constitute estoppel and prevent the employer and the state 
of Wyoming from invoking the statute of limitations as a 
defense. This case is, therefore, reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
N T h e  State also contends that even if estoppel shouldbe 
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THOMAS, Chief Justice, dissenting. 
I must dissent from the decision of the majority of the 
court in this instance. In Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 
600 (19782 this court dealt with the question of estoppel 
to assert the bar of the statute of limitations. That case did 
not involve a claim for worker's compensation, but my 
examination of the law in this area does not disclose any 
distinction between worker's compensation cases andother 
cases with respect lo theapplication of equitable estoppel. 
It appears that Ann White's role at the time that she spoke 
with the appellant may have been equivocal. ~ v e n  
assuming that she was acting as an agent of the Town of 
Saratoga, the strongest interpretation that can be given to 
the stipulated information is that she stated there was no 
coverage. I am satisfied that the better reasoned opinions, 
which I believe represent a majority mIe, dealing with the 
denial ofcoverageor liability hold that the employer is not 
estopped from asserting the defense of the statute of 
limitations. Lee v. Kinzberlv-Clark Cornoration, 
Aia.Civ.Au~.. 418 So.2d 164 (1982); Joyce v. Paul 
Haljes Arnoco Service Station, 161 Ga.Apu. 373, 288 
S.E.2d 266 (1  9821; Miller v. Olinkrafi, Inc., La.Aup., 
395 So.2d 902 (1  98 1); Drane v. City o f  New Orleans, 
La.Aup.. 328 So.2d 752 (1976); Kohlbeck v. Citv of 
Omaha. 2 11 Neb. 372.3 18 N.W.2d 742 (1 982); 
v. Slrick Trailer Co.. 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 518. 312 A.2d 471 
(1973)- and Trzoniec v. General Controls Co., 100 R.I. 
448, 2 16 A.2d 886 (1966). These cases distinguish 
between the denial of liability and conduct which lulls the 
employee into a false sense of security or causes hi to 
believe he will be taken care of without filing a claim. 
With respect to the authorities reliedupon by the majority 
opinion, my reading of several of those cases persuades 
me that a strict application of the concept of ratio 
decidendi results in a conclusion that they do not all stand 
for the propositions for which they are cited, although 
there is broad language included which could lead one to 
the interpretation placed upon them by the majority. In 
Tazlianeitiv. work in en!^ Cornpemafio~zAnnealBoard, 63 
Pa.Cmwlth. 456. 439 A.2d 844 (19811, for example, the 
court held that estoppel did not prevent the assertion of the 
statute, because while the employee was confused, the 
employee was not lulled by the employer's conduct. 
The decisions in those cases which have limited estoppel 
to instances in which the employee was lulled in such a 
way that the claim was not asserted, hut do not permit 
estoppel where the employee was informed that there was 
no coverage, are consistent with what we said in Turner v. 
Turner, supra The statement by White that there was no 
worker's compensation coverage would not be conduct 
which wouldjustify*1054 an estoppel against the town to 
raise the statute of limitations. 
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
ROONEY, Justice, dissenting. 
The majority opinion correctly accepts the fact that the 
statute of limitations, without more, would bar appellant's 
claim. The legislature has so provided: 
"(a) No order or award for compensation involving an 
injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence 
rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, 
shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the 
injury, an application or claun for award is filed with the 
clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred, 
within one (1) year after the day on which the injury 
occurred * * *." Section 27-12-503(a), W.S. 1977. 
Appellant recognized that she had suffered a compensable 
injury on December 14, 1981. The claim was not filed 
until April, 1983. See Baldwin v. SarNion, 50 WYO. 508, 
62 P.2d 531. 108 A.L.R. 304 11936); Remis v. Texaco, 
Wvo., 401 P.2d 708 (1965). The statutory time limit in 
which lo file a claim had expired. 
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Nor does appellant's situation afford to her the exception 
to the limitation period provided by the legislature: 
"If an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a 
minor, or where death results from the injury if any of his 
dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the 
time when any right or privilege accrues under this act [$$ 
27-1 2-101 through 27-12-8041, no limitation of time 
provided for in this act shall run so long as the 
incompetent or minor has no guardian." Section 
27-12-505, W.S.1977. 
Was Ann White speaking as a nurse for Dr. Lunt? Or was 
she speaking as a part-time employee supervisor of the 
EMT unit on Saratoga's airplane ambulance? And, if the 
latter, did she have authority to waive the statute of 
limitations on behalf of Saratoga or to act or speak on 
behalf of Saratoga in this matter so as to estop Saratoga 
from application ofthestatuteof limitations? It is difficult 
to treatAnn White's advice, given in the doctor's office 
while treating appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being 
given .on behalf of the Town of Saratoga under these 
circumstances. 
" * * * The doctrine of implied agency or ostensible 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds an exception to authority applied to private parties or corporations is 
the statute of limitations in a waiver by the employer of an limited very much, so far as municipal corporations are 
estoppel through the acts of the employer. With this, I concerned ' * *." S. Goldberz & Co. v. Citv of Cedar 
disagree. Rapids, 200 Iowa 139,204 N.W. 216 119252. 
In the first place, I question the assumption that the 
employer was involved in any waiver or estoppel. 
Appellant does not contend for any fraudulent or 
intentionally deceptive action on the part of the employer. 
In her brief, appellant states, " * * * we do not contend the 
Employee was deceived any more than negligently by Ann 
White * * *." Ann White was a Nurse Practitioner in the 
office ofDr. John Lunt, M.D., in ~aratoga. Carbon County 
maintains an airplane ambulance for flights from Carbon 
County to Laramie, Denver, etc. Ann Whiteand appellant 
worked part timeon theambulanceEMTcrew. Annwhite 
was the supervisor of the crew. About thirty days before 
appellant suffered a ruptured eardrum on a flight of the 
airplane ambulance, the Town of Saratoga had taken over 
the operation of the airplane ambulance from the county. 
The day after her injury, appellant sought medical 
attention from Dr. Lunt, where she was treated by Ann 
White. It was Ann White's statement that she did not 
believe worker's compensation coverage existed for 'the 
injury because of the part-time nature of the employment 
which is the basis for the claimed estoppel or waiver 
against the Town of Saratoga. 
*I055 The Iowa court pointed out that the extent of 
authority is a matter of record in statutes and ordinances 
for municipal matters and not known only to the principal 
and agent as is the case with private parties. 
The only reasonable appraisal of the situation is that 
appellant could not have relied on Ann White's comments 
as those of the town. She should be charged with 
knowledge contained in the placard which is required to 
be posted by every employer, and which sheis taken to 
have read. It notified her of the necessity of filing a timely 
claim.. She should not be allowed to rely on advice 
received from another part-time employee, albeit a 
supervisor of a limited and special activity who was 
probably acting as a nurse for an attending physician at the 
time, for a waiver of the statute of limitations by the 
employer or to establish an estoppel against the employer 
to assert such statute. 
Inasmuch as the privilege of the statute of limitations is 
personal, a waiver, in this instance, can only be by the 
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Town of Saratoga or someone empowered to act for it. 
Slrvke~ v Rasch 57 Wvo. 34. 112 P.2d 570, 136 A.L.R. 
m r e h .  denied I 13 P.2d 963 (1 94 11 The power to act for 
a municipality in most respects is statutorily given to the 
governing body of the municipality. Section 15-1-103, 
W.S.1977. See 15-2-201 and 15-2-202, W.S.1977; re 
restrictions on acceptance of claims by governing bodies 
of towns. 
Finally, the advice given by Ann White pertained to a 
matter of law. 
"The well-recognized rule is that a represenlation as to a 
matter of law will not ordinarily support an action for 
fraud or deceit, nor constitute an estoppel to rely upon the 
statute of limitations', the reason for the rule being that 
representations as to matters of law are ordinarily 
considered as expressions of opinion, and justifiable 
reliance cannot be had upon the mere opinion of another. 
* * * " 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions 6 451. D. 
913 (1970). 
I would affirm. 
Wyo.,1985. 
Bauer v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div. 
695 P.2d 1048 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, ) 
Claimant, ) 
v. 1 IC 2005-509704 
1 
HERlTAGE SAFE COMPANY, 1 
I 
Employer, ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION 
and ) 





Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 72-718, Claimant moves for reconsideration of the 
Commission's October 10, 2008 decision in the above-referenced case. Claimant objects to the 
Coinmission's finding that Claimant was not misled by Defendants for purposes of Idaho Code 5 
72-706(1). Claimant also objects to the Commission's finding that Claimant did not receive 
colnpensation from Defendants within the meaning of Idaho Code $ 72-706(2). Defendants 
reply that Claimant's motion constitutes a request to re-weigh evidence and arguments already 
considered and ruled upon. Defendants ask the Commission to deny Claimant's motion. 
The Commissioll agrees with Defendants that Claimant's arguments on both issues have 
already been considered. The Commission carefully examined and weighed all evidence and 
arguments before rendering its original decision and remains unpersuaded by Claimant's 
arguments 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 1 
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
@ 
DATED this day of December, 2008, 
WDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
@.J 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 2008 a true and correct copy of Order 
Denying Reconsideration was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
KENT A HIGGINS 
PO BOX 99 1 
POCATELLO ID 83204-0991 
E SCOTT HARMON 
PO BOX 6358 
BOISE ID 83707 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 2 
DAVE R. GALLAFENT 
KENT L. HAWKINS* 
THOMAS W. CLARK 
THOMAS J. LYONS 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR 
KENT A. HIGGINS* 
IAN C. JOHNSON 
JARED A. STEADMAN 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK 
ALSO ADMITTED M UTAH 
+ALSO ADMITTED W IOWA 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
109 N. ARTHUR - 5'" FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 991 




P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
Re: Quinton Bunn v. Heritage Safe Co. and Liberty Northwest 
I.C. No. 2005-509704 
Dear Sirs: 
Enclosed for filing is Notice of Appeal. Thank you. 
With best regards, 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
Enclosure 
A.L. MERRILL ( 1  886-1 9 6 0  
R.D. MERRILL (1 893.1 972) 
W.F. MERRILL ( I  919-2005) 
Kent A. Higgins 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #3025 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, 
Employer, 
and 




) I.C. No. 2005-509704 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Idaho Code 5 72-724 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS 
Heritage Safe and Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. 
AND ITS ATTORNEY 
E. Scott Harmon 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
Notice of Appeal 
0:\69\6943E'leadingsWotice of Appeal.wpd Page 1 
4 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
AND THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Quinton Bunn, through his attorney, Kent A. Higgins, 
appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order entered in 
the above entitled matter on the 10th of October, 2008, and the Order Denying Reconsideration riled 
December 17,2008. 
2. The parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or 
or&: describe:! in paragraph ! ~bove  ssp agpez!able prxsuan! to h!e  1 !(a)(!) end 14 (h) of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. The issues of this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Whether the commission erred in deciding that medical treatment is not 
compensation. 
(b) Whether the commission erred in finding that an erroneous denial letter to a 
claimant is not misleading. 
(c) Whether the commission erred in finding the statute of limitations for filing 
Claimant's claim expired. 
(d) To the extent, if any, the commission's findings may be construed to imply 
that medical treatment was not obtained for claimant by his employer, 
whether any such findings are based in law or fact. 
4. A reporter's transcript is requested of the trial, however a transcript has already been 
obtained. 
5. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: Briefs on Motion to Reconsider. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy ofthis noticeof appeal and any request for additional transcript have been 
served on the reporter, or the rules requirements of I.C. 3 72-725 are met. 
@) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
Notice of Appeal 
0:\69\6943PleadingsWotice of Appeal.wpd Page 2 
4 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
q 
Dated this &day of January, 2 0 0 d  
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the matter, do hereby 
a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
E. Scott Harmon [ 
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON, WHITTIER & DAY 
Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 6358 [ ] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 [ ] Telefax 
RECEIVED 
lTtfl,i?D StJPREifE C(jIlRT 
n t!.;rPriT i ;F [;PpEAi.S 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUNTON BUNN, 
swmm C o m T  No.  3 h ~  J 
Claimant-Appellant, ) 
v. ) CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
) (QUINTON BUNN) 
HERITAGE SAFE. COMPANY, Employer, ) 
and LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE ) 
CORPORATION, Surety, 1 
1 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission Chairman James F. Kile presiding. 
Case Number: IC 2005-509704 
Order Appealed &om: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED OCTOBER 10, 
2008; AND ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
ENTERED DECEMBER 17,2008 
Attorney for Appellant: Kent A. Higgins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Attomey for Respondents: E. Scott Harmon 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707 
Appealed By: QUNTON BUNN, Claimant 
Appealed Against: HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer, and LIBERTY 
NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety, 
Notice of Appeal Filed: January 5,2009 
Appellate Fee Paid: NONE 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF QLJINTON BUNN - 1 
Name of Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
P.O. Box 658 
Blackfoot, ID 83221 
Transcript Requested: The entire standard transcript has been requested. 
The standard transcript has been prepared and 
is on file with the Industrial Commission. 
Dated: 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF QUINTON BUNN - 2 
CERTIFICATION 
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho, 
hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the NOTICE OF 
APPEAL FILED JANUARY 5,2009; FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ENTERED OCTOBER 10, 2008; AND 
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION ENTERED DECEMBER 17, 2008, RE: 
QUINTON BUNN'S SUPREME COURT APPEAL, herein, and the whole thereof. 
Dated the 5TH day of JANUARY, 2009. 
Assistant Commission Secretary: k*ee+. 
? ' t+-% *... ,,. * 
'*, @ 0 F ID b 
*% ,,,,,,,, **+*' 
CERTIFICATION 
CERTIElCATION OF RECORD 
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and papers 
designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by Rule 28(3) of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are 
correctly listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme 
Court upon settlement of the Transcript and Record herein. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this day of MARCH, 2009. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
QUINTON BUNN, ) 
Claimant-Appellant, ) SUPREME COURT NO. 36024-2009 
v. 1 
HERITAGE SAFE COMPANY, Employer, 
1 
) NOTICE OF COMPLETION 




TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; 
AND KENT A. HIGGINS, ESQ., FOR CLAlMANT QUINTON BUNN; 
AND E. SCOTT HARMON, ESQ., FOR DEFENDANTS HERITAGE SAFE 
COMPANY, EMPLOYER AND LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, SURETY. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTDFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Kent A. Higgins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
E. Scott Harmon 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have hveizty-eiglzt days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, 
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the 
Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the !Transcript and Record 
shall be deemed sealed. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 10TH day of MARCH, 2009. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1 
